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FOREWORD 
It is difficult to say at what precise moment the idea of 
producing this volume was first raised, but the actual decision to 
go ahead with it was made some time late in 1993. The background 
to it was the long professional interest that both authors have 
had in the Baltic, as a result of which both have published - 
separately or jointly - a fair number of articles on the subject in 
various journals. This has been followed by numerous invitations 
to lecture or lead discussions in various forums in recent years, 
naturally on themes related to the Baltic. 
The range of precise topics has been a vast one, extending 
from arms supervision arrangements to changes in the strategic 
situation and descriptions of the navies maintained by the various 
nations, not forgetting the pressures for a nuclear weapons ban. 
We have accumulated substantial archives on the subject in the 
course of time, and all this encouraged us to make use of the 
material in a more comprehensive form. 
The Baltic Sea is both an interesting topic and a highly 
relevant one at this present moment, principally, of course, 
because of the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of 
the Soviet Union with all the consequences that arose from that 
event, affecting not only the Baltic Sea as such but also many of 
the countries and regions bordering onto it. This is a process of 
change that is still going on. 
Finland has considerable interests at stake in the changes 
affecting the Baltic region. Her security has always been closely 
bound up with events and disturbances occurring in this region, 
and in the present case the situation is complicated still further 
by problems involving merchant shipping, the rebuilding of 
harbours and the redefinition of territorial waters. People in 
Finland thus have a great interest in monitoring the situation 
very carefully. 
The subject of this publication is restricted to the sea area 
itself, the changes that have taken place in naval strategy and the 
way in which these are reflected in matters of security policy. If 
we had set out to examine the security of the countries of the 
Baltic as a whole the subject would have become unmanageable. 
Similarly we do not concern ourselves here with other 
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international arrangements that affect the Baltic area, although 
the most significant joint agreements are mentioned in the 
Introduction. 
This publication has not been produced for any specifically 
defined purpose, although it was clear from the outset that it was 
likely to prove useful in research and teaching, and it is with this 
in mind that it has been provided with full references and details 
of sources. It was also hoped that it would serve the general 
needs of people interested in the Baltic for one reason or another. 
Attempts have been made to illustrate the text with tables, figures 
and maps wherever possible. 
Helsinki, January 1996 
Mikko Viitasalo 	Bo Österlund 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The change in Baltic naval strategy following the 
disintegration of the Warsaw Pact 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and cessation of the 
Warsaw Pact radically altered the situation regarding naval 
strategy in the Baltic area, in that the spheres of strategic interest 
of the Soviet Union/Russia shifted from the southern part of the 
Baltic Sea to the north, close to Finland and her territorial waters, 
while the navies of the former Warsaw Pact countries bordering 
on the Baltic Sea and the doctrines governing them underwent 
profound changes. In particular, Russia has lost the significant 
bases, military harbours and maintenance depots which it once 
had in the Baltic states. 
There had already been signs of reduction in the Baltic 
Fleet in the final years of the Soviet Union, with the year 1991 
apparently marking the turning point. It was still gaining new 
vessels in 1990, which was in all respects a productive year in 
shipbuilding terms for the Soviet navy.' On the other hand, 
where the 1990/1991 issue of the prestigious yearbook Military 
Balance notes that the Soviet Baltic Fleet comprised some 350 
vessels in 1990, the figure reported for 1991 in the 1991/1992 
issue was only some 160.2 
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has also been Secretary-General of the Scientific Committee for National Defence. 
Captain (Navy) Bo Österlund has served as Chief of Operations at Naval 
Headquarters since July 1994. He worked earlier as an instructor in naval tactics 
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Department. 
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Apart from the reduction in the number of vessels, they 
were also somewhat smaller in size. The Commander-in-Chief of 
the Baltic Fleet, Admiral Vladimir Yegorov, mentioned some 
time ago that the number of Soviet ships in the Baltic is due to 
decrease by almost 40%, evidently referring by this to the effects 
of the loss of naval bases in the Baltic states. According to Yegorov, 
the vessels taken out of service in 1993 were obsolete missile-
carrying submarines,3 so that recent information suggests that 
Russia now has approximately 15 submarines in its Baltic Fleet, 
of which three are fitted with cruise missiles.' 
The reductions in the number and size of vessels in the 
Baltic Fleet are obviously linked to a change in doctrine, the most 
probable direction of development being towards the creation of 
some kind of combined training and coastal fleet, although still 
retaining substantial Russian military strength in the Baltic and, 
in the changed situation, bringing it closer to Finland. 
On the other hand, it may only be a slight exaggeration to 
say that one entire navy, the Volksmarine of the former GDR, has 
disappeared from the scene completely. At the time of the 
unification of Germany in autumn 1990, the Volksmarine had 
some 130 vessels, including the smallest category, patrol boats. 
The largest were three Rostock-class frigates.' 
The tonnage of the former Volksmarine has largely been 
sold to Indonesia, Tunisia, Turkey and Uruguay, while a few 
vessels remained in use with the unified German navy for the 
transition period. The fleet as a whole represented outdated 
technology and could not be converted to the systems used by 
the western German navy.' The new German navy has gradually 
begun to make use of the former East German naval bases, 
however, the easternmost of which is Peenemunde, close to the 
Polish border. 
The Polish navy is also adopting a more lightweight 
character. According to the 1994/1995 issue of Military Balance, 
that country now has some 69 fighting ships, including patrol 
boats and 3 submarines. It has rapidly reduced its stock of heavy 
landing craft, which may originally have been intended for 
transport purposes in the service of the Warsaw Pact. At its peak 
in 1989, the number of Polish landing craft reached 46, whereas 
the current figure is 8. The Polnocny class has also entirely been 
withdrawn, and the 5 new landing craft are of the Lublin class. 
The purpose for which they are intended has also altered, 
however.7 
A general agreement to remove nuclear weapons entirely 
from the Baltic area has also been discussed in recent years. A 
news item in a Swedish daily newspaper in 1993 nevertheless 
drew attention to the numbers of Russian nuclear weapons in the 
area. Citing the Norwegian version of the 1992/1993 issue of 
Military Balance, it alleged that Russia had had 96 tactical nuclear 
weapons in the Baltic a couple of years earlier. The number had 
evidently dropped to 84 later, but increased again to 128.8 
The published data and conclusions based on these should 
be approached with caution, however, as the tactical weapons 
listed in the above journal are dual-purpose ones, i.e. they may 
carry either nuclear or conventional warheads. Any increase in 
the number of tactical nuclear weapons in the Baltic Fleet would 
be a contradiction of Russia's avowed decision to withdraw such 
weapons from its fleet. The following news item was 
communicated by Itar-Tass on 4.2.1993: 
'All tactical nuclear weapons have been removed from 
vessels and multi-purpose submarines, as well as naval aircraft, 
and placed in centralized storage in accordance with statements 
by the USSR president of the 5th October 1991 and president of 
the Russian Federation of 29th January 1992, the press service of 
the Russian Ministry of Defence reported.' 
Although the report does not indicate when these tactical 
nuclear weapons had been removed, it would certainly seem 
that the trend in the Baltic area is towards nuclear-free naval 
traffic. 
1.2 Problematic issues 
It is reasonable in connection with the present discussion 
to raise the following questions regarding major issues of naval 
strategy in the Baltic: 
How substantial were the signs of changes and reductions 
in the Soviet Baltic Fleet in the last years of the Soviet Union? 
Were the changes due to a relaxation of tension internationally, 
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or to economic difficulties, or both? These aspects and trends in 
the strength of Soviet/Russian Baltic Fleet will be discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
How will Germany act in these years of change? The focus 
in the development of its navy so far has been on the Atlantic, 
where it is now taking its own share of the responsibility for the 
security of merchant shipping, the foundations for which action 
were laid in the final years of confrontation between the major 
military alliances. The German navy with its air support is 
nevertheless the strongest naval force in the BALTAP area and 
the southern Baltic. So far no obvious attempts to strengthen its 
presence in the Baltic can be perceived in the German navy's 
construction and refitting plans, but any increase in the extent to 
which the German navy conducts exercises or deploys its vessels 
in the central parts of the Baltic, and even more so the northern 
parts, will naturally carry a political and military interest of its 
own.9 In fact, there already are some signs of change in the 
interest shown by the German navy in the Baltic region, and this 
aspect will also be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
Changes are also taking place in NATO as regards its relation 
to the Baltic, in that its areas of responsibility are being defined 
more specifically. The Chief of Staff of BALTAP mentioned in an 
interview published in the magazine Marine Rundschau in the 
early summer of 1988 that these areas of responsibility also include 
the gulfs of the Baltic Sea. A new large-scale entity known as 
Allied Forces Northwest has been established, with its 
headquarters in Great Britain, representing a merger of the old 
English Channel Region with the Northwestern Region and 
bearing responsibility for an area covering Great Britain, Norway, 
the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, including the Gulf of Finland 
and the Gulf of Bothnia. This entity also includes the new Principal 
Subordinate Command (PCS) which replaces the Allied Forces 
Northern Europe Command located in Norway. 
This new arrangement defines responsibilities for the Baltic 
area within NATO more specifically, so that vessels sailing under 
the NATO flag will be a common sight in the Gulf of Finland, 
and possibly even in the Gulf of Bothnia. This is nothing dramatic, 
of course, as it will obviously be necessary for the new forces to 
become familiar with their areas of responsibility. The joint naval 
manoeuvres between some NATO countries and countries 
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bordering on the Baltic, which were initially proposed by the 
United States and in the first round of which Finland also 
participated in summer 1993, should be seen against this 
background. The former Commander-in-Chief of the Swedish 
Armed Forces, General Bengt Gustafsson, has commented on the 
increased military and political interest shown by NATO in the 
Baltic Sea, but one must immediately add to this the evaluation 
of one Swedish expert that the increased visits by NATO vessels 
to the Baltic are not an indication of any "operative advance".10 It 
is undoubtedly an indication of a change in the situation, however. 
Relations between NATO and the Baltic will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 6. 
A further fact that we will have to face in the near future 
may well be that despite the drive for the exclusion of nuclear 
weapons, the Baltic will never become an entirely nuclear-free 
area. This means that nuclear-powered warships, mainly Russian 
ones, will evidently continue to sail through the Baltic, even 
though they may not be a permanent part of the Russian fleet 
there, and nuclear-propelled NATO ships may be seen in the 
area in times to come. We will go into these questions further in 
Chapter 7. 
1.3 Importance of the Baltic Sea route for Russia 
The Baltic Sea still forms a vitally important outlet and 
security zone for Russia, for reasons that are so well-known that 
they do not need to be discussed here. In his speech to the sailors 
of the Russian navy at Baltisk on 15.3.1993, the Russian Foreign 
Minister Andrei Kozyrev pointed out that Russia must hold on 
to its powerful position in the Baltic in order to be able to protect 
the Kaliningrad area from any territorial claims that might be 
advanced by the Germans or other right-wing powers. He also 
announced that he was in favour of a continuous, effective Russian 
army presence in the Baltic area. It should be noted, however, 
that he later modified this statement at some points. 
Russia's shortage of harbour capacity in the Baltic will be a 
permanent problem for many years to come. Commercial harbour 
statistics for the 1980's indicate that some 30% of all visits by 
Soviet ships were made to the harbour of Leningrad and the rest, 
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just under 70%, to harbours of the former Baltic socialist republics 
and the Kaliningrad oblast. This means that the number of vessels 
using the harbours of St. Petersburg and its nearby areas will 
now have to be increased substantially in order to ensure that all 
transport takes place via the country's own harbours. It is well-
known, however, that these harbours are already severely 
overcrowded. The number of commercial visits to the Baltic 
ports of the former Soviet Union amounted to some 12,000 per 
year in the mid-1980's, of which 4000 were to Leningrad." On the 
other hand, the quantity of goods passing through the latter port 
decreased in the early 1990's, so that having been 11 million 
tonnes in 1990 it was only some 5 million tonnes in 1992. Russian 
foreign trade still relies to a great extent on the ports of the Baltic 
states.12 
The above serves as a background to the current Russian 
plans to build new large-scale harbours close to St. Petersburg.13 
Russia's commercial navigation and harbour projects in the Baltic 
area will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
1.4 Literature on the Baltic Sea and definition of the topic of 
the present study 
The literature for this work was compiled by means of the 
computer search system available in the library of the National 
Defence College, which yielded an extensive body of source 
material from the 1990's. In addition, manual files were consulted 
in order to examine the literature from the late 1980's, as the aim 
of this work was also to evaluate the events of the 1980's in the 
Baltic and to formulate conclusions on whether the aim of the 
Soviet Union to reduce the number of large vessels in its Baltic 
Fleet and alter the role of this fleet had already begun to be 
implemented in the last years before disintegration. 
It should be mentioned here that a bibliography on the 
Baltic area was compiled for a meeting of parlamentarians from 
the Baltic states in Helsinki in 1991, comprising a total of 211 
titles and including books and articles on security policy." 
Other arrangements regarding the Baltic area will not be 
discussed here, even though the above bibliographies contain an 
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extensive list of publications produced by the Commission for 
Environmental Protection in the Baltic which would enable the 
reader to examine the problems in this field in more detail. 
Similarly the work of the Council of Baltic States will also not be 
discussed here, since we have deliberately restricted ourselves to 
aspects of naval strategy and security policy, although some of 
the subjects dealt with here may touch upon such matters, as in 
the case of the alleged dumping of nuclear waste in the Baltic 
Sea. 
Other matters of current interest are fishing," the activities 
of the Nordic Council and the question of its possible expansion 
to include the Baltic states. These lie beyond the scope of the 
present study, however, for the reasons mentioned above. 
As far as the Baltic topics that have been omitted here are 
concerned, the reader is referred to works such as 'The Baltic Sea 
Area - A region in the making', which contains scientific articles 
by a total of 16 experts that provide an extensive discussion of 
the Baltic and the surrounding area from a variety of viewpoints. 
The volume includes two articles on security policy and 
disarmament.16 
13 
2 THE MILITARY GEOGRAPHY OF 
THE BALTIC 
The Baltic region is usually considered to comprise the sea 
area itself, its coastal areas and the channels, bays and canals 
leading to the sea area, e.g. the Straits of Denmark, the Gulf of 
Riga, the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Bothnia.17 
Oceanographers do not regard the Baltic as either an ocean 
or a lake but as a large brackish water basin with a marked 
limnological stratification in terms of density which persists 
throughout the year. As a consequence of its highly complex 
geology, profound changes have taken place in hydrographic 
conditions and later in the biological features of the resulting sea 
over the last ten thousand years.18 
The Baltic Sea is a long, narrow body of water with a surface 
area of some 200,000 km2, measuring some 280 km across at its 
widest point, between Sweden and the Baltic states, and some 40 
km at its narrowest, between Denmark and the coast of the 
former GDR. Its average depth is 60 m, the deepest points, located 
to the east and north of Gotland, being 450 m. The shallow area 
west of Bornholm has a maximum depth of 55 m.19 
The Straits of Denmark are not very deep: Oresund 8 m, the 
Great Belt 17 m, the Little Belt 13 m and the Kattegat 23 m.20 More 
detailed information on this subject is available in scientific 
publications on the marine physics of the Baltic, one of which 
lists the following average depths for the various parts of the sea 
area: Baltic Sea proper 67 m, Gulf of Riga 28 m, Gulf of Finland 38 
m, Åland Sea 77 m, Bothnian Sea 68 m and the Bothnian Bay 43 
m. A depth chart with placenames is given in Fig. 1.21  
The Baltic area is located between 54° and 66° N lat. and is 
characterised by major climatic differences. South-westerly winds 
prevail and temperatures fluctuate from one year to the next, 
which affect the extent of the sea ice in winter. Ships normally 
encounter no difficulties with ice in the Baltic Sea proper, nor in 
the Kattegat or the Straits of Denmark, whereas it is common for 
the Gulf of Bothnia, Gulf of Finland and Gulf of Riga to freeze 
over. Sea traffic can be maintained throughout the winter by the 
use of ice-breakers.22 
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Assessments of the extent of the sea ice on the Baltic have 
been carried out in Finland for decades. The smallest recorded 
extent was in the winter of 1988-1989, 52,000 km2, and the greatest 
established with certainty in 1941-1942, 420,000 km2. The Baltic 
Sea may also have been completely covered by ice in the winter 
of 1946-1947, but the data on this are somewhat uncertain.23 
The maximum extents of the sea ice on the Baltic in 1720-
1992 are classified in Fig. 2, which also shows the smallest recorded 
extent and the average for all winters.24 
The temperature and salinity of the sea water affect the 
propagation of sound waves in it and are thus reflected in the 
measurement technology that can be used for underwater 
surveillance purposes. A large body of scientific data is available 
on salinity and temperature at various standard depths. These 
physical properties will not be discussed in any greater detail 
here, however, as the emphasis is on strategic matters, but the 
reader is referred to the literature on the subject25 
There are certain important canals that provide links with 
the Baltic, the most significant of which are the Kiel Canal, which 
is some 100 km in length and can accommodate vessels of up to 
10,000 brt and with a maximum draught of 8 m, and the system 
that runs from the White Sea to the Gulf of Finland, which also 
gives access via Lake Ladoga to the waterways leading to the 
Black Sea. The latter involves 19 locks and stretches of open 
water on Lakes Onega and Ladoga, but its usefulness is moderated 
by the fact that it is frozen over for about 200 days a year. The 
maximum permitted tonnage is 3000 brt, maximum length 115 m 
and maximum draught 5 m.26 
The important strategic role of the White Sea canal system 
lies in the fact that it enables naval technology, military equipment 
and vessels to be transferred from the factories and docks of the 
St. Petersburg area to the Severodvinsk in the Archangelsk area 
and to the Murmansk area unnoticed by outsiders by means of 
waterways lying entirely within Russia. 
The tonnage restrictions can be overcome by means of 
pontoons and other technical arrangements. 
All in all, in spite of its small size, the Baltic Sea can be 
regarded as a complex area in terms of its military geography. It 
should be remembered when evaluating time factors in military 
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terms that it takes 24 h for a rapid surface vessel to travel a 
distance equal to the length of the sea area but only 1-1.5 h for an 
aircraft to do the same. 
As far as underwater operation is concerned, the narrow 
passages in the southern part of the Baltic lie in an area with 
fairly shallow water so that it would be difficult for submarines 
to operate there, whereas the deeper zones include areas which 
are suitable for submarines. It should also be remembered that 
stratification of the water in the Baltic means that operating at 
the boundary between two water masses with dissimilar physical 
properties can be particularly convenient for a submarine on 
account of the difficulties involved in locating a source of noise. 
The introduction of increasingly effective, mobile acoustical 
measurement devices backed up by airborne measurement of 
the magnetic interference caused by submarines may nevertheless 
restrict underwater operations in the Baltic area in future. 
16 
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FIG 1 	Depth chart of the Baltic Sea 
SOURCE: P. Mälkki & R. Tamsalu, Physical Features of the Baltic Sea, 
Finnish Marine Research No. 252 (1985) 
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FIG 2 	Maximum extents of sea ice on the Baltic in winter, 1720-1992 
Min (km) Max (km2) Number % 
Minimum (M) 52000 
Extremely mild (EL) 52000 81000 29 11 
Mild (L) 81001 139000 60 22 
Normal (K) 139001 279000 91 33 
Average (Ka) 218000 
Severe (A) 279001 383000 63 23 
Extremely severe (EA) 383001 420000 30 11 
273 100 
EA 
SOURCE: A, Seinä & E. Palosuo, Classification of maximum ice cover on the Baltic Sea, 
1720-1992, Meri No. 20, 1993 
3. QUESTIONS OF TERRITORIAL 
WATERS IN THE BALTIC AREA 
As laid down in the UN General Agreement on Marine 
Rights drawn up in 1982, all nations are entitled to extend their 
territorial waters to a maximum of 12 nautical miles from the 
basic coastline defined in accordance with this general agreement. 
Although the agreement has not yet been ratified, the above 
regulation can already be regarded as expressing an established 
right. Thus more than a hundred states already have territorial 
waters of this size, including Russia, Germany, Sweden, Poland, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, with some exceptions regarding 
areas such as the Gulf of Finland, for example. The territorial 
waters of Denmark are still 3 nautical miles in width. 
Sweden took the decision to expand its territorial waters to 
12 nautical miles on 1.7.1979, with an additional provision in the 
form of an agreement concluded with Denmark on 25.6.1979 
regarding Öresund, where passages of width 6 nautical miles 
were left on either side of the central line that constitute 
international waters. It was also agreed that the contracting parties 
would inform each other 12 months beforehand of any intention 
to expand their territorial waters in the area covered by the 
agreement. Sweden restricted its territorial waters to 9 nautical 
miles in this same area by a statute of 1.1.1980, evidently partly 
on the grounds of the difficulty of supervising the approach to 
the Straits of Denmark in view of the fact that some 100,000 
vessels pass through what would otherwise be a projecting tongue 
of Swedish territorial water or the area adjacent to it in the course 
of a year. The current boundaries of territorial waters are depicted 
on the map of the Baltic Sea in Appendix 1. 
The law effecting a change in the territorial waters of Finland 
passed in 1995 divides this sea area into internal and external 
territorial waters. The internal territorial waters comprise an 
area bounded towards the land by the shoreline and the estuaries 
of the rivers and towards the open sea by a broken line joining 
the outermost points of Finnish terrain, i.e. promontories, islands 
or skerries, given that the distance between two such fixed points 
should not exceed twice the width of the territorial waters, i.e. 24 
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nautical miles. The one exception to this is at Bogskär, where two 
consecutive fixed points are just over 27 nautical miles apart. The 
external territorial waters then constitute a zone beginning 
immediately at the outer limit of the internal territorial waters, 
an extending outwards for 12 nautical miles, i.e. 22,224 m, unless 
otherwise stated in the law.27 
An agreement concluded between Finland and Estonia on 
4.5.1994 to ensure the free passage of shipping in the Gulf of 
Finland requires that Estonia should restrict the width of its 
territorial waters so that it does not extend closer than three 
nautical miles to the central line. Likewise, Estonia is required to 
inform Finland at least 12 months in advance of any intended 
expansion of its territorial waters which deviates from the above 
agreement. The same requirement also applies to Finland.28 
A comparable agreement concluded between Finland and 
Sweden on 2.6.1994 concerns the determination of the boundary 
between the continental shelf and the fishing zone in the Åland 
Sea and the northern part of the Baltic.29 The agreement establishes 
the entire marine boundary between the two countries as far as 
the southernmost coordinate point indicated in it, a boundary 
that had previously remained undefined. The broken line laid 
down under the agreement passes south of Märket to terminate 
at a point south of Bogskär. 
The sea area subject to Finnish law is further defined in the 
Customs Regulations, which specifies an additional customs zone 
extending 2 nautical miles outwards from the boundary of Finnish 
territorial waters.30 Enforcement of the new law has meant a 1.7-
fold increase in the area of Finland's external territorial waters 
and a 2.5-fold increase in terms of water volume. 
Finland's extension of her territorial waters to 12 nautical 
miles conforms to the general practice followed by neighbouring 
countries in the northern and north-eastern part of the Baltic, 
and at the same time makes the territorial waters easier to control 
and easier for others to observe. Thus it substantially improves 
the ability of the authorities to monitor the entry and departure 
of people and vessels, and to prevent smuggling and the spread 
of other criminal activities across borders. It is also easier to 
differentiate between illegal immigrants and persons moving 
about legally in coastal waters if the authorities are able to stop 
and inspect vessels further out to sea. The extension of the 
country's territorial waters also implies an extension of the 
customs zone. 
This extension also yields a number of advantages in terms 
of defence. It is now more difficult for foreign vessels moving 
legally in international waters to carry out reconnaissance 
missions, since they are forced to remain further away from the 
coast and to use regular commercial shipping lanes. In addition, 
it will be easier to organize manoeuvres and defence measures 
without the threat of outside observers in a wider territorial sea 
area.31  
A further advantage is that it will be easier to focus defence 
measures on the deep channels leading from the open sea to the 
coast, and in the event of a crisis it should be possible to use 
mines to force hostile surface vessels and submarines to use 
routes which from the Finnish point of view are of secondary 
importance. This will mean a significant improvement in Finland's 
possibilities for actively controlling the use of her territorial waters 
or for preventing this entirely. 
The extension has no direct effect on the status of the Åland 
Islands as a demilitarized zone. The ability of the Finnish navy to 
operate in the direction of the Åland Islands will greatly improve, 
however, as the restrictions apply only to a zone of width 3 
nautical miles in the territorial waters. The basic problem 
nevertheless still remains, that Finland has no sovereignty over 
the area as far as the establishment of defence arrangements in 
peace-time is concerned. The demilitarized area of the Åland 
Islands and its boundaries are depicted in Appendix 2. 
As far as the Gulf of Finland is concerned, the extension of 
the territorial waters has been implemented symmetrically with 
Estonia, leaving a corridor of 3 nautical miles on either side of the 
central line (total 6 nautical miles). This will ensure the free 
passage of international shipping and air traffic to the area of 
Russia at the head of the Gulf. 
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4. ROLE OF THE BALTIC SEA IN 
RUSSIA'S MERCHANT SHIPPING 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union substantially reduced 
Russia's port facilities on the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. The 
Baltic Sea has for centuries been the only sea route reaching close 
to the core areas of Russia, and thus this loss in shipping capacity 
cannot fail to have military as well as commercial and financial 
repercussions. Russia can, of course, still make use of the harbours 
in the Baltic states, but this will mean transit payments and will 
have to be based on the existence of good political relations. Use 
of the railways and harbours of these countries for military 
transportation would be much more problematic, as it would 
require negotiations and agreements between individual 
countries. 
The most important Baltic ports for the Soviet Union's foreign 
trade in the 1980's were Leningrad, Tallinn, Riga, Ventspils and 
Klaipeda. Statistics on shipping in these ports are included in 
those published by the Baltic Pilotage Authorities Commission, 
from the figures for the early 1980's presented in Table 1 are 
derived.32 
Table 1 	Numbers of ships visiting Soviet ports on the Baltic in 1980-1984 
Port 1 980 1 981 1 982 1 984 
Leningrad 3 338 3 492 3 743 3 743 
Tallinn 2 650 1 764 1 739 1 889 
Riga 1 695 1 854 2 291 1 749 
Ventspils 2 606 2 530 2 821 2 886 
Klaipeda 1 688 1 619 1 573 1 605 
Total 11 977 11 259 12 167 11 872 
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As indicated in Table 1, the total number of ships visiting 
these ports was approx. 12,000 a year, some 31% of which came 
into the port of Leningrad. 
It may be mentioned for the purposes of comparison that a 
total of some 22,000 vessels per year visited the ports of 
Finland in 1983 and 1984, which is almost twice the figure 
recorded for the Soviet ports on the Baltic. 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the restoration of 
the independence of the Baltic states placed Russia in a difficult 
position, as 56% of its harbour capacity reverted to the possession 
of these new independent states.33 The importance of these ports 
for Russia may be appreciated from Fig. 3.34 
Russia announced in the early 1990's that it planned to 
construct new large-scale harbours close to St. Petersburg on the 
bays of Ust-Luga, Primorsk and Batareinaya35 Estimates 
suggesting that these projects should be completed by the year 
2000 must b approached with caution, however. If this timetable 
does hold good, it will substantially increase the volume of 
Russian merchant shipping on the Gulf of Finland, as it will 
enable the direct flow of goods to reach closer to the core areas of 
Russia and lead to savings in the costs of transit traffic. If one of 
the harbours were also designed for military purposes, this would 
increase military traffic as well, mainly in the area between the 
new harbour and that of Baltiski in the Kaliningrad area. 
Russia's economic problems were also reflected in the 
country's foreign trade, in that where a total of some 90 million 
tonnes of goods passed through its Baltic harbours in 1989, before 
the economic crisis, the figure declined steadily in the early 
1990's, to only 39 million tonnes in 1992, although an improvement 
took place in 1993, when the total was 46 million tonnes. These 
fluctuations are indicated in Fig. 4.36 
It has been estimated that Russian trade through Baltic ports 
will increase to 55.5 million tonnes by the year 2000 and to as 
much as 98.0 million tonnes in 2005.37 
These estimates clearly presuppose an increase in Russia's 
own harbour capacity, and the aim is evidently that the new port 
of Ust-Luga would concentrate on coal, chemicals, fertilizers and 
other dry bulk cargoes and that on the Bay of Batareinaya (see 
map, App. 3) on exports of liquids such as petroleum and 
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petroleum products, with an initial capacity of 7.5 million tonnes 
a year. The harbour to be constructed at Primorsk, which would 
also concentrate on the handling of liquid cargoes, would be 
larger, with a planned total handling capacity of 19 million tonnes 
of crude oil, 6 million tonnes of oil products and another 6 
million tons of chemicals for export and import purposes.38 
Although it is by no means a simple matter to predict the 
direction that Russia's merchant shipping may take, the routes 
that could most conveniently be used may be divided into three 
categories: 
- direct deliveries to Russian harbours, including that of 
Baltiski in the Kaliningrad area, 
- deliveries to harbours in the Baltic states and transport to 
Russia from there, and 
- deliveries via Finnish harbours, primarily Hamina, Kotka 
and Kokkola. 
An investigation has recently been completed by the Finnish 
Ministry of Transport on changes in the flow of goods to and 
from Russia on the Baltic Sea, providing an evaluation of these 
changes from Finland's point of view, and concluding, for 
example, that as much as 10 million tonnes of Russian exports 
and imports could be transported via Finland in addition to the 
current 5 million tonnes.39 It is also stated in the report that 
competition between the harbours of Russia, the Baltic states and 
Finland will become more fierce. Improvements in infrastructure 
are being designed in the Baltic states, including the harbour of 
Muuga east of Tallinn in Estonia. All in all, shipments to and 
from Russia are expected to increase by 40-50 million tonnes a 
year in next few years.4° 
It is possible that in spite of political disagreements, the 
focus of Russia's goods traffic will be on via the Baltic states. 
Signs of this are already detectable, in that the Baltic states are 
being spoken of as a 'gateway' between Russia and Western 
Europe.41 This scenario would mean that Finland was no more 
than a temporary diversion on the route. If the costs of 
transporting goods via the Baltic states remain low and deliveries 
run smoothly, the pressures upon Russia to build new ports at 
the head of the Gulf of Finland will be alleviated. 
24 
The maintaining of connections via the ports of the Baltic 
states is a justifiable alternative for Russia in both economic and 
strategic terms, as suggested in an investigation by Christian 
Willman, who argues the importance of the Kaliningrad area to 
Russia. He notes that from a military point of view, the Russian 
navy would be in a ready-made trap if it decided to base itself at 
the eastern tip of the Gulf of Finland, while it must be accepted 
that no harbour in the latter area would be free of ice all the year 
round.42 It is thinking of this kind that emphasizes the strategic 
importance of the harbours and transport infrastructure of the 
Baltic states to Russia. This of course poses a danger to these 
countries as far as their security position is concerned, particularly 
in the case of a crisis in eastern Central Europe. 
One extreme in statements regarding the importance of the 
Baltic countries to Russia is represented by Vladimir Zhirinovksi, 
Chairman of Russian Liberal Democrats, who in a recent interview 
stated that: "When we take over power in six months' time, the 
Baltic states will cease to exist." Referring to transit facilities via 
Finland, Sweden and Germany, he went on: '...and we will be 
using our own harbours, the new harbour of Tallinn and those of 
Klaipeda and Riga."43 
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FIG 3 	Volumes of Russian foreign trade in 1991 and main routes. 
SOURCE: Expert meeting on ports and maritime transport, 
Publication of the Maritime Research Centre of 
the University of Turku A 18, Turku 1995 
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FIG 4 	Trends in Russian foreign trade through Baltic ports 
in the early 1990s. 
SOURCE: 	Changes in the flow of goods to and from Russia in the Baltic 
area from the point of view of Finland, Publications of the 
Ministry of Transport 8/94, Helsinki 1994 
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5. NAVAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
BALTIC 
5.1 General 
The circumstances which have led to current state of the 
naval affairs in the Baltic area have perhaps been influenced 
most distinctly by the deterioration in the Soviet Baltic Fleet, 
which comprised more than 90,000 men, at least 50 submarines, 
more than 10 destroyers, 3 cruisers, some 100 frigates and corvettes 
and 250 smaller combat vessels in 1989 but had declined to 
around 100 vessels by the beginning of 1995. This marks a 
substantial retraction of forces. The disengagement of the navies 
of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from that of their former mother 
country is now nearing completion, and all three countries have 
founded navies of their own using vessels purchased from other 
countries of the Baltic, exchanged or received as a form of aid. 
The reduction of 9.5% made in the Danish defence 
programme in recent years will presumably restrict the number 
of their Stanflex 300 multi-purpose vessels to 14. These vessels 
are equipped in peacetime for patrol, combat, mine-laying and 
minesweeping duties, but would not be used for patrolling 
purposes in times of crisis, when the majority of them would be 
used as combat vessels. 
Participation in the expanding UN naval activities has to a 
great extent shaped the development of the German navy. Both 
the country's extensive frigate programme and the new 212-class 
submarine programme are likely to be affected by financial 
cutbacks, and the fleet will evidently be reduced by half by the 
year 2005. Thus only four frigates, one submarine of the new 
class and two maintenance vessels are due to be completed in 
1996-2005. 
Sweden, Finland and Poland are all working towards 
effective, independent naval defence systems. The new 
Västergötland-class submarine Gotland launched by Sweden at 
the beginning of 1995 the engines of which operate entirely 
independently of any external air supply, marks a significant 
leap forward in the development of underwater weapons 
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technology for domination of the Baltic. 
The outcome is that total number of naval vessels present 
in the Baltic has decreased by some 8% from the peak figure of 
approx. 760 in the late 1980's, i.e. to around 710 vessels, and the 
trend would seem to be continuing. 
The number of submarines has declined by as much as 36% 
over the last four years, that of destroyers has remained 
unchanged, that of frigates is more or less unchanged, the number 
of combat vessels has declined by 16% and the number of 
minelayers and minesweepers has dropped by 27%. The only 
increase has been in landing craft, mainly attributable to the fact 
that the Swedish navy equipped six amphibious battalions with 
some 200 half-platoon landing craft. Trends in combined naval 
strength in the Baltic area are indicated in Fig. 5. 
5.2 The Russian navy in the Baltic 
When attempting to predict the trend in Russian naval 
strength in the post-Cold War era one is apt to recall the words 
uttered by Sir Winston Churchill in his radio speech to his fellow 
countrymen in November 1939: "I cannot forecast to you the 
action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an 
enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national 
interest." 
The Baltic Fleet, the oldest detachment of the Soviet navy, 
was at its heyday on the verge of the Second World War, at 
which point it boasted two battle ships, four cruisers, 21 
destroyers, 65 submarines, a number of smaller vessels and a 
powerful air wing of 656 aircraft.' 
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FIG 5 	Total naval strength in the Baltic 
SOURCE: 	Weyers Flotten Taschenbuch 1978-90, 
Jane's Fighting Ships 1993/94 
As a result of the post-war reconstruction period, during 
which new cruisers, destroyers, frigates, submarines and smaller 
vessels were added to all the Soviet fleets, the Baltic Fleet exceeded 
its Czarist predecessor in size. It was also at that time that facilities 
were set up for the building of aircraft carriers. One of the aims 
was to create an instrument for showing the flag on the oceans of 
the world. 
The year 1990 marked a turning point in the development of 
the Soviet navy, and the disintegration of the country it 
represented and the military alliance that had formed around it 
followed the next year. On the other hand, a total of 10 
conventional submarines, one nuclear submarine and nine fairly 
large surface vessels were built during that year, making it the 
most productive in military shipbuilding terms since 1982.45 By 
the end of the year, however, work had begun on the demolition 
of older tonnage, mainly from the 1960's, which meant that some 
30 submarines, 50 surface vessels and more than 50 maintenance 
and auxiliary vessels had been taken out of active service within 
a few years. By the beginning of the 1990's, the first generation of 
diesel submarines, including the Hotel, Echo and November 
classes, had reached the age of 30 years which must be regarded 
as the upper limit for the profitable use of military vessels, and 
the same threshold was also achieved by the first Papa and 
Alpha-class nuclear submarines. Thus the situation at that stage 
was that over 100 surface vessels (some 10% of the total tonnage) 
and more than 150 submarines (40% of the total tonnage) were 
awaiting demolition.46 
Some 20 military vessels were under construction at the 
time of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, of which the 
largest ones, still uncompleted, were the aircraft carrier Varyag 
(formerly Tbilisi) in the Ukraine and the cruiser Peter the Great 
(formerly Juri Andropov) in St. Petersburg. The shipbuilding 
budget for 1991 was reduced by as much as 21% relative to the 
previous year, and by 1992 all the Russian navy's shipbuilding 
programmes had been suspended, presumably due to a lack of 
finance- and raw materials. In spite of this interruption, however, 
6 submarines, 2 destroyers, a number of hovercrafts, 4 missile 
boats and 1 landing craft were completed during the year, together 
with 6 patrol vessels and 1 smaller patrol boat for coastguard 
duties.47 
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In addition to new ships, some 60 vessels were awaiting 
renovation or modernization in 1992, but as the result of the lack 
of financial resources, these were eventually moved to the reserves 
and then demolished. Funding was available during 1992 only 
for shipyards located in Russia proper, and no new shipbuilding 
projects were commenced. The last time a similar situation had 
prevailed was during the Civil War of 1917-1920.48 
The number of vessels in the Russian Baltic Fleet has been 
declining throughout the 1990's. At the beginning of the decade 
it had a total of 6 nuclear-armed submarines (Juliette-class), 41 
conventional submarines, 13 destroyers and 31 frigates, 155 patrol 
vessels, 119 minesweepers and anti-mine vessels and some 120 
maintenance and auxiliary vessels. These were based at Tallinn 
and Paldisk in Estonia, Bolderaja close to Riga and also Ventspils 
and Liepaja in Latvia, and Klaipeda in Lithuania. The bases of 
Baltiski and Leningrad were backed up with reinforcement 
opportunities in Poland and to some extent in East Germany.49.10 
The calendar data for 1991/1992 indicate that the number of 
vessels had declined from 350 at the beginning of the decade to 
161 vessels, and the latest Norwegian edition of Military Balance, 
for 1994/1995, puts the figure at 109 vessels. The number of 
submarines had fallen to 15. There are still reported to be 4 dual-
purpose Juliette-class submarines in the areas' 
Other reasons for this decline in the fleet in addition to 
decommissioning are transfer to other fleets, especially that 
operating in the north, since Russia's strategic canal network 
leading from the Baltic Sea to both Murmansk and the Black Sea 
enables such transfers to be made discreetly.52 The diminished 
possibilities for basing ships in the Baltic Sea area have thus led 
to a reduction in the numbers maintained there and altered both 
the composition and the duties of the fleet. 
Given the new situation and the reorganized infrastructure, 
the Baltic Fleet has the following duties: 
- to maintain a military deterrent together with the other 
arms of the defence forces, with the aim of persuading any 
putative agressor to abandon all hostile intentions towards Russia 
or its allies, 
- to defend Russia's independence, autonomy, territorial 
inviolability and national interests against any threats proceeding 
from the direction of the sea, 
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- to take action together with the other arms of the defence 
forces to intercept any attack on Russian or its allies by inflicting 
damage on the agressor's military potential and to destroy his 
forces by means of a naval attack, 
- to place naval forces at the disposal of the international 
community for the preservation of peace and security.53 s4 
Fulfillment of the above duties requires that the country's 
strategic nuclear forces should be kept in a high state alert. The 
destruction of enemy forces in the sea areas bordering on Russia 
necessitates the gaining of control over the narrow passages in 
the Baltic, and the Straits of Denmark and the Bornholm Basin 
are still decisive in this respect. The task of supporting the front 
on land has dropped down in the hierarchy since the Baltic states 
gained their independence, but more emphasis has inevitably 
come to be placed on support for operations in the St. Petersburg 
and Kaliningrad areas. Kaliningrad in particular, since it lacks 
any reliable land connection under its own control, places 
particularly high demands on sea connections and their protection 
along the whole length of its Baltic coast. 
One consequence of this reduction in the number of surface 
vessels has been an increase in pressure for a high-performance 
air strike force in the area," and it is now the case that the 
Russian SU-24 Fencer aircraft carrying a full weapon load are 
able to operate throughout the Baltic area. Thus the task of 
acquiring mastery of the sea, or seizing this from a potential 
enemy, will partly devolve upon the naval air detachment.56 
Thus the future of the Russian Baltic Fleet will depend on 
the opportunities for establishing supportive bases in the area on 
the one hand and on the new shipbuilding programmes and the 
way in which these affect the development of naval vessels on 
the other. 
The gaining of independence by the Baltic states reduced 
the length of the Baltic coast controlled by Russia, to the extent 
that the total length of the outer boundary of the country's 
territorial waters is now only just over 200 km. The role of the 
Baltiski base, which was estimated in 1993 to be used by 75% of 
the surface interception vessels, 60% of the anti-submarine vessels, 
20% of the minesweepers and all the landing craft, seems likely 
to increase still further.57 The area also has a vital shipbuilding 
and repairs industry, and the Jantar shipyard in Kaliningrad, 
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which builds the Udaloi and Neustrashimyi-class vessels, is of 
vital importance to the Baltic Fleet and to the Russian navy in 
general. Part of the significance of Kaliningrad to the Baltic Fleet 
lies in the fact that the harbours of that area lie on a stretch of 
coast where the sea very seldom freezes, so that the fleet cannot 
be prevented from setting sail by natural conditions. By contrast, 
the situation in the St. Petersburg area, which can be surrounded 
by ice for as long as 6 months in the year, can very rapidly come 
to resemble that during the Second World War, when the Baltic 
Fleet was caged in at the head of the Gulf of Finland for very long 
periods. Protection of the route from St. Petersburg to the 
Kaliningrad area, a distance of about 1000 km, may well become 
the primary task of the Baltic Fleet, at least at the initial stages of 
a possible crisis. 
Russia's planning of its naval forces is largely governed by 
the decline in financial resources and the increasing age of its 
vessels. The previous shipbuilding programme terminated in 
1990, and this has now been followed by a new one which will 
cover the 10-year period 1993-2003.58 
One corollary of the ageing of the vessels is that the number 
of types of vessel in use is declining. Current shipbuilding 
programmes concentrate on one type of nuclear submarine and 
one type of conventional submarine, and it is likely that the main 
type of diesel-operated submarine, known so far as the Amur 
project, will be the successor of the Kilo class. This latter, of 
which as many as 24 individuals have been built to date, seemed 
to be establishing itself as the main type in the Baltic Sea in the 
1980's, replacing the Foxtrot and Whiskey classes, but with a 
draught of 2500 tons, it probably proved too large. Naval calendars 
now indicate that there is still one of these left in the Polish navy 
and one in the Russian Baltic Fleet. Submarines of this type has 
been exported to China, for example, since 1995.59 There is also a 
new nuclear submarine type which represents a more advanced 
version of the Akula class. The keel was laid for the first vessel of 
this class, the Severodvinsk, in 1993.60 
The 67,000 ton flagship of the Russian navy, the Admiral 
Kuznetsov, which is continuing test cruises at the head of the 
Northern Fleet, may be the only one of the large surface vessels 
to remain in active service, as its sister ship the Varjag may well 
be destined for demolition in the Ukraine. The Peter the Great 
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which is still under construction in St. Petersburg, may in the end 
prove to be the only battle cruiser." 
The number of 8100-ton anti-submarine destroyers of the 
Udaloi class (Baltic Combatant, BAL-COM-3) may remain at 12, 
the last six of which were constructed at the Jantar shipyard in 
Kaliningrad. There is at least one Udaloi-class destroyer in service 
with the Baltic Fleet, while the fleet in its present form will 
probably not increase on its present complement of 17 missile 
destroyers of the 7800-ton Sovremennyi class (BAL-COM-2I). 
The last destroyer in this series was the Besstrashnyi, completed 
on 17th April, 1994. All the vessels of the class were built at the 
Zdanov yard in St. Petersburg, and there are at least two of them 
in the Baltic Fleet. It is likely that future shipbuilding programmes 
will include a modified missile destroyer.62 
The Neustrashimyi (BAL-COM-8) antisubmarine frigate is 
another new class of vessel, the first of example of which entered 
active service in 1991. According to the commander of the Russian 
navy, this will become the main type of surface vessel in the 
future.63 It has a draught of some 4000 tons and carries anti-
aircraft missiles, anti-submarine missiles and mine-laying rails 
in addition to an anti-submarine helicopter. The use of stealth 
technology is clearly reflected in the form of superstructure used 
in these vessels. The first vessel is now in operation in the Baltic 
Fleet,64 and a total series of 7 vessels is planned initially. 
The decision to scrap most of the largest vessels may also be 
attributable to crew recruitment difficulties. Most of the vessels 
are 75% manned by conscripts.65 It should be noted, however, 
that 84% of the 1993 intake of conscripts were not called up at all, 
so that those entering national service cannot even satisfy the 
navy's minimum needs. At the same time the crew of some 900 
needed to man one cruiser of the Admiral Ushakov class would 
be sufficient enough to run three Udaloi-class vessels. One 
solution to the crew problems is of course to enlisted sailors 
under paid contracts. 
The new shipbuilding programme will also be accompanied 
by the Assigning of resources to modernization, or at least plans 
exist to this effect. This modernization will mainly concern 
developments in missile technology. The intention is to equip 
frigates of the Krivak class with SS-N-25 missiles. 
According to Admiral Vladimir Yegorov, commander of 
the Russian Baltic Fleet, existing development plans will provide 
the Baltic Fleet with two destroyers, two patrol vessels and one 
minesweeper in 1995. Admittedly it should already have received 
one destroyer in 1994, but there has not yet been any evidence of 
it.66 
Reinforcement of the Baltic Fleet with the above vessels will 
not be sufficient to maintain its current strength, however, in 
view of the fact that 70% of the vessels have reached an age of 10-
15 years. This means that their replacement will be essential at 
the latest when the current shipbuilding programme terminates, 
at the end of the millennium. 
The main emphasis in the development of the naval air 
capacity force will be on anti-submarine helicopters, multipurpose 
helicopters and fighters. Given the probability that their number 
will be cut by half, this development will evidently be angled 
more towards qualitative aspects.67 
In seeking to predict the future of the Baltic Fleet, it may be 
noted on the basis of existing plans that Kaliningrad will evidently 
retain its position as a major naval base, and that the Baltic Sea 
will continue to be used for the testing of new vessels for as long 
as military shipbuilding goes on in the area, either for Russia's 
own use or for export. It is quite natural in view of the reduction 
in the number of vessels and of bases in the Baltic that 
development measures will be focused on qualitative 
improvements as the expense of quantity, so that the size of the 
Baltic Fleet seems likely to remain at some 100 vessels. 
A map of Russia's naval bases in the Baltic is provided in 
Appendix 3 and a summary of the vessel making up the Baltic 
Fleet in 1990-1995 in Appendix 4. 
5.3 Navies of the Baltic states 
The disengagement of the states of Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania from the former Soviet Union has now almost been 
brought to completion, and all Russian troops have left those 
countries. It is true that the Skrunda space observation station 
and its staff will remain in Latvia until 1998 under an agreement 
concluded between the two countries, but the blowing up of the 
36 
radar installation on 3.5.1995 may in practice speed up the 
departure of the staff from the country. There are still Russian 
personnel at the older radar stations, however. 
The navies of the Baltic states have taken over the bases left 
behind by the Russians, the most significant ones having been 
inherited by Latvia, those of Liepaja and Bolderaja outside Riga. 
The Russian troops took all the usable material with them, of 
course, leaving behind only debris and scrap that could best be 
classed as hazardous waste. 
The development of a national navy has advanced furthest 
in Lithuania. The country purchased two Grisha-class 
antisubmarine frigates from the Russians, and these now form 
the backbone of their fleet. The vessels have been involved from 
1992 onwards in the Baltops and Partnership for Peace (PIP) 
manoeuvres held in the Baltic. The country also has two Turja-
class torpedo boats, a Storm-class torpedo boat from Norway 
and several smaller patrol boats. 
The Latvian navy has also inherited vessels from the 
Russians, and addition to which it has been given two formerly 
East German Kondor-class patrol boats and some Osa-class missile 
boats by Germany, patrol vessels by Sweden and Denmark and a 
Storm-class torpedo boat by Norway. Operational problems have 
arisen particularly in the case of the former East German vessels. 
Estonian naval operations have primarily been of a 
coastguard nature, employing vessels mainly obtained from 
Finland, Sweden and Norway. These old, but still usable vessels 
have enabled the country to create its own mobile surface control 
capability. The development of a navy is still in its early stages 
and, as in the case of the other Baltic states, is dependent largely 
on donations at the present time. Estonia was given unarmed 
patrol and missile boats that had previously belonged to the East 
German Volksmarine, and it also has some Kondor-class patrol 
boats, which will be used as minesweepers in order to ensure the 
safety of navigation in its coastal waters. 
Like the other Baltic states, Estonia, will need support from 
neighbouring countries in order to develop its navy. This concerns 
all aspect of naval activity, including training, which Finland is 
best placed to provide for its neighbour on the southern shore of 
the Gulf. 
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Data on the naval strength of the Baltic states are compiled 
in Fig. 6. 
5.4 The Polish navy 
The outstanding feature of the Polish navy up to the mid-
1980's was its extensive fleet of landing craft, evidently part of 
the plans of the Warsaw Pact for the eventuality of having to 
mount an invasion in the Baltic area. Poland thus had the 
following landing craft in 1984: Polnocny-class 23, Marabat-class 
4 and Eichstaden-class 15, i.e. a total of 42 ships.68 Of these, the 
Polnocny-class landing craft were the most significant in many 
respects, being classified as capable of carrying a number of 
tanks and having its maximum tare of as much as 1200 tons.69 
A number of naval development projects were going on in 
the late 1980's. Their missile destroyer (Kotlin class) had already 
become obsolete, as had the three W-class submarines. 
Meanwhile, more landing craft capacity was needed. The Kotlin-
class destroyer disappeared from the lists in the handbooks in 
19867° and the W-class submarines did so gradually, the final one 
being last mentioned in the statistics in 1989.71  
The following general trends can be seen in development of 
the Polish navy as it approached the 1990's and the major change 
in military policy that took place at the beginning of the decade. 
The submarine fleet was renewed, so that by 1990 the country 
had one Kilo-class submarine and two Foxtrot-class submarines 
of Soviet origin armed principally with 533 mm torpedoes.72 The 
larger surface vessels were also being renewed at the same time. 
The Kotlin-class destroyer was taken out of service in 1988 
and the modified Kashin-class destroyer Warszava was 
commissioned in that year. A Kaszub-class frigate is mentioned 
in the handbooks for the first time in 1987, but without any 
detailed information given on it.73 The order for a second Kaszub-
class frigate had to be cancelled, but the aim is evidently to 
supplement the series with four additional vessels, chiefly for 
antisubmarine use.74 
It seems likely that missile cruiser Warszava will be 
decommissioned in the near future due to its high maintenance 
costs and limited operative value, but the question of building 
the four new Kaszub-class frigates may well be revived, provided 
that they can be equipped with new western fighting command 
systems. Germany is said to be reluctant to sell the most recent 
types of equipment to Poland, however.75 
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The political and doctrinal changes were most clearly 
reflected in the fate of Poland's landing craft. The country had 
more than 40 of these by 1990, comprising 23 of the Polnocny 
class, two of the new Lublin class and 16 lighter craft. Construction 
of the Lublin class had commenced in the late 1980's and marine 
tests were performed in 1989. They have a tare of approximately 
1700 tons when fully loaded.76 
The shedding of landing craft began in 1991, and by the end 
of 1994 the country had only 8 left, of which 5 were of the Lublin 
class and 3 of the light Deba class. None of these was actually in 
service as a landing craft. Those of the Lublin class, for instance, 
can be used for minelaying purposes. The Polnocny-class vessels 
have been sold for commercial use or scrapped, except for two 
which are still in use, one having been converted to a command 
vessel." 
The number of corvettes and missile boats would seem to 
have remained more or less stable, the old Osa I missile boats 
having been replaced by Gornic-class (former Tarantul I) corvettes 
carrying longer-range SS-N-2C Styx marine target missiles. The 
Poles had 7 Osa I-class missile boats and four Comic-class 
corvettes in 1994, although it may be that the number of vessels 
of the latter type will not increase any further in spite of certain 
plans to that effect.'$ Speculations have also been voiced regarding 
possible modernization of the Gornic-class missile corvettes and 
the Orkan-class (former Sassnitz-class) vessels currently being 
used for patrol purposes.79 
A summary of trends in the complement of the Polish navy 
is provided in Table 2. 
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Table 2 	Trends in the complement of the Polish Navy in 1986-1995 
Class 1985 1990 b) 1994 `) Notes 
Submarines 3 3 3 W class 3 (85), Kilo 1, 
Foxtrot 2 (90, 94) 
Destroyers 1 1 1 Kotlin class (85) 
Mod-Kashin class (90, 94) 
Frigates 0 1 1 
Corvettes 3 4 4 
Combat vessels e 57 19 a) 28 0) Missile boats 13 (85), 
11 (90), 7 (94) 
Minelayers/minesweepers 51 32 24 
Landing craft 41 41 8 4 Polnochny 23 (85), 23 (90), 
Lublin 2 (90), 5 (94) 
The Military Balance 1985-1986, printed October 1985 
The Military Balance 1990-1991, printed August 1990 
The Military Balance 1994-1995, printed October 1994 
Classification used in the Military Balance and Jane's. 
This class also includes vessels carrying missiles, torpedoes or other 
weapons, e.g. such as patrol boats with artillery 
The figure for 1990 does not include Pilica patrol boats, 
whereas 11 are included in the figure for 1994 
No longer used for landing missions 
5.5 The German navy 
The development of the German navy has been governed 
by financial considerations and trends in military policy. The 
participation of the German navy in international operations, 
beginning with the sending of a German minesweeper division 
to the Persian Gulf in spring 1991, has introduced new features 
into this development and also set new requirements for the 
choice and use of vessels.80 
The German navy reacted to the altered military situation as 
early as the end of 1991. As laid down in the defence resolution 
of 26.11.1992, the tasks of the German navy were revised and 
measures undertaken to reduce the number of vessels in the 
German navy as part of a programme known as MARINE 2005. 
Financial resources in any case no longer permitted the 
replacement of decommissioned vessels on a 1:1 basis. 
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In addition to fulfilling national needs, the German navy is 
required to contribute to the placement of multinational NATO 
naval units in various scenes of action. 
The duties that may be involved in this are: 
- maintenance of naval control in an area, with temporal 
and/or geographical restrictions where necessary, 
- maintenance and protection of the Sea Lines of 
Communication (SLOC) between the United States and the 
continent of Europe 
- backup for a land front or landing, 
- protection of allied nuclear forces at sea. 
These duties require the navy to be able to operate efficiently 
on the North Sea, the Atlantic and the Baltic, to be able to 
guarantee territorial inviolability and to protect sea connections 
and activities on and close to the coast. It should also be capable 
of intercepting any attack from the sea areas off Germany. One 
object of emphasis in the duties assigned to the German navy is 
the protection of sea connections on NATO's northern flank, i.e. 
close to the Norwegian coast.81  
Other trends governing the development of the German 
navy in addition to the above are: 
- The annual finances available during the planning period 
up to the year 2005 will be some 4200 million FIM, which 
will mean a reduction of some 20% relative to the 1990 
level. 
- The navy will decrease in size to 24,000 men, on account of 
a drop in the size of the conscript age class, an increase in 
the number of persons opting out of military service and a 
change in the population base. 
- Replacement of the combat vessels acquired in the 1960's 
will have to be commenced during the next planning period 
at the latest. 
- The availability of material to be placed at the disposal of a 
NATO multinational fleet must be guaranteed. 
- Account must be taken of the vessels and aircraft in service, 
entering service or under design at the beginning of the planning 
period.82 
In the light of the MARINE 2005 programme and the above 
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contributory factors, the German navy will be composed of the 
following vessels at the termination of the planning period 1990-
2005: 
16-20 frigates 
The plans for building a minimum of 15 frigates constitute a 
precondition for maintaining 12 vessels on continuous alert. 
Weapon and command systems for three 124-class frigates to 
replace the Lutjens class, will be designed by the year 2002, and 
construction of the vessels themselves will commence by the end 
of the present millennium, so that they should enter service in 
2004-2006. 
The frigate fleet will thus consist of eight 122-class (Bremen 
class), four 123-class (Brandenburg class) and three 124 class 
frigates. The Lutjens-class destroyers will be based at Kiel for the 
rest of their service life, and the new 124-class frigates, in 
accordance with their sphere of operation, at Wilhelmshaven on 
the North Sea, the port which will thus become the main base for 
this class.83 
20-30 patrol boats/corvettes 
The existing 143 Albatross, 143 A Gepard and 148 Tiger 
missile boat classes will reach the age of 30 years by the end of 
the millennium, and work on replacement plans should 
commence during the period leading up to 2005. The dependence 
of missile boats on frequent visits to their bases means that the 
support system should be developed alongside the construction 
of the new class of vessels. The first eight of the new class of 
corvettes which can be regarded as one alternative replacement 
should be operative by 2005-2008 and the next seven from 2008 
onwards. The corvettes will be stationed at the new base of Hohe 
Dune in Warnemunde, which will be fitted out specifically for 
vessels of this type. 
Designed for use in second-order crises, the corvettes will 
be equipped with multisensors and integrated remote-control 
supervision and reconnaissance systems in order to create the 
overall picture of the military situation necessary to their task. 
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10-14 submarines 
The German submarine fleet is composed of six 205-class 
and 18 206-class vessels, 12 of the latter type, designated 206-A, 
having been modernized in the late 1980's. The existing 
submarines will reach the end of their service life during the next 
planning period at the latest. 
By the end of the millennium the fleet will be composed of 
ten 206-A submarines and according to current plans at least 
four new ones of the 212 class. These will be equipped with air- 
independent fuel cell motors in addition to conventional diesel-
electric motors. The total complement of 10-14 submarines 
indicated as corresponding to the needs of the German navy 
cannot be attained in the context of the current financial 
framework. 
The submarines will be based at Eckernförde on the Baltic 
coast. 
20-30 minesweepers 
The key element in the future of Germany navy's 
minesweeping capacity is the construction of 10 Frankenthal-
class vessels, one of the most extensive projects it has undertaken. 
In addition, the Hameln-class minesweepers will be equipped 
for search duties and the integration of the Lindau-class 
minesweepers into the Troika remote-control system will also be 
completed during the current planning period. 
The minesweeper fleet was reorganized in 1994, and most of 
the vessels were moved to a single base at Olpenitz. 
Alongside with development of minesweeping facilities, the 
Troika system and five Frankenthal-class vessels will be 
modernized and refitted by the year 2000. Both the diver company 
attached to the minesweeper division and the combat diver 
company have also been developed further. 
All minesweeping functions will be transferred to the base 
at Olpenitz close to the Straits of Denmark in the course of the 
present decade.8' 
38-42 naval helicopters 
60-65 naval fighter-bombers 
12-14 naval patrol aircraft 
44 
The powerful air component of the German navy, which 
will supplement and guarantee navigation by naval vessels 
throughout the area of operations, will continue to comprise 
both conventional aircraft and helicopters. The naval assault 
planes will carry Kormoran sea target missiles. 
The naval air component has undergone a profound 
organizational changes in the last few years, and is expected to 
have the following complement by the end of the planning period 
in 2005: 
Number Type Remarks 
54 Naval combat aircraft 
M RCA Tornado 
12 Antisubmarine and naval To be replaced by MPA 2000 
reconnaissance aircraft at the end of the planning period 
BR 1150 Atlantic 
4 Naval reconnaissance aircraft 
EW BR 1150 Atlantic 
38 Helicopter To be replaced by the 
Sea Lynx NATO helicopter NH 90 
Sea King 
2 Oil pollution surveillance aircraft, 
Dornier 228 
The bases for these types of aircraft will be distributed 
evenly amongst the three support areas. 
The MARINE 2005 programme will reduce the number of 
vessels from 189 in 1990 to 135 in 1995 and to just over 80 vessels 
upon its completion in 2005. The fleet of 62 combat vessels allowed 
for under the MARINE 2005 programme is approximately a half 
of the number that existed at the beginning of the present 
decade.85One feature of this development plan for the German 
navy is an orientation towards vessels of the size which would 
enable operation on the open sea, a trend governed both by the 
MARINE 2005 programme and by NATO requirements regarding 
the use 'of such vessels and the maintenance of a continuous state 
of alert, since the contribution of the German navy to the discharge 
of the alliance's responsibilities is constantly increasing. The 
maintenance of a crisis management capability covering the whole 
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of Europe will also require the development of a system for 
servicing at sea alongside that of the fleet itself. 
According to current plans, the German navy is required to 
place the following equipment at NATO's disposal: 
- 50% of its frigates; 
12 of the existing vessels have been estimated to be in 
continuous operation with NATO, leaving six to perform national 
duties. 
- 65% of its missile boats; 
Evaluation of the existing complement sets out from the 
assumption that 16 boats can be placed in continuous operation 
with NATO, which leaves 4-5 boats to safeguard national interests. 
- 50% of its submarines; 
Since the continuous availability of one submarine requires 
the existence of 2.5 of them, it can be estimated that the entire 
submarine fleet will be assigned to NATO. 
The operations of the German navy seems to be centred on 
three strategic areas, each with an operative command of its 
own, one or more military academies and a principal base with a 
full range of services. 
With the emphasis in the network of bases and the location 
of vessels on the Baltic coast, there is no evidence until now to 
suggest any shift in emphasis towards open sea or ocean areas. 
Information on development of the German navy is provided 
in Appendix 5 and a description of the bases and their 
infrastructure in Appendix 6. 
5.6 The Danish navy 
The tasks of the Danish defence forces, as defined in a law 
passed on 1.1.1994, take account of change in the strategic situation 
and emphasize international operations and humanitarian 
interventions. They are further governed by their country's 
obligations to the NATO alliance with respect to the defence of 
the Straits of Denmark, i.e. the Danish navy must be capable of 
participating in NATO's multinational fleets in the various areas 
and activities under the organization's jurisdiction. 
In this capacity, the Danish navy must contribute to: 
- protecting NATO's north-western seaboard, 
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- ensuring connections via Danish territorial waters between 
NATO's North-Western and Central Forces 
- closing of the Straits of Denmark to traffic or protecting 
navigation them. 
As laid down in Denmark's national objectives, the main 
task of the navy during peacetime is to supervise sea traffic 
through the Straits of Denmark and to control the country's sea 
and fishing areas around the Faeroes and Greenland. It also has 
the following support duties: 
- supervision of fisheries, 
- prevention of environmental damage and supervision of 
territorial waters, 
- icebreaker services, 
- safeguarding of Denmark's national interests in the 
surrounding sea areas, and 
- providing support for actions by the authorities86 
The fleet developed for execution of the above tasks has 
declined in strength from some 60 vessels in 1990 to slightly over 
40 vessels in 1994. 
The network of Danish bases was reduced at the beginning 
of the 1990's to two main bases, of which Frederikshavn in 
Northern Denmark is responsible for vessels operating in the 
surrounding sea areas and on the North Sea and Korsör for those 
operating in the Straits of Denmark.87 The navy's total complement 
comprises the control vessel fleet, minesweeper fleet and 
submarines based at Frederikshavn and an escort vessel 
detachment and combat fleet operating from Korsör. 
The present attempts to develop the Danish navy commenced 
in the latter half of the 1980's, when practically all its extensive 
fleet of surface vessels reached the end of their service lives at 
more or less the same time.88 Altogether it had become reasonable 
or essential to replace a total of 22 vessels around the mid 1980's. 
In spite of the state of confrontation that prevailed during the 
Cold War era and the major importance of the Straits of Denmark 
to the western allies, neither national nor allied resources were 
adequate for a one-to-one replacement of the vessels.89 The 
development plans therefore led to a programme of building a 
type of multipurpose vessels which would involve attaching 
specialised combat equipment and armaments to one and the 
same design of hull as required. The vessels, known as STANFLEX 
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300 on account their design and draught, can be used for anti-
submarine purposes, minelaying, surface combat exercises and 
anti-aircraft operations. The first vessel in a series of 16 was 
completed in 1989 and the eleventh at the end of 1994. The 
programme is still going on and the last vessel is estimated to be 
launched in 1997. Six of the vessels will be used for patrol duties, 
five for surface interception, four as minesweepers and one for 
minelaying.90 
As the series advances the vessels can be fitted out differently, 
the basic scheme being five vessels armed for surface combat 
duties, four for minesweeping and seven for minelaying, while a 
total of 12 vessels will be convertible to surface combat use, three 
for minesweeping and one for minelaying in the event of war.91  
It is possible that the rapid modular interchanging of 
functions that originally inspired the Stanflex scheme will never 
fully be achieved, and that such changes can only be made in 
connection with major refits, annual servicing or the like. The 
Stanflex scheme is indicated in diagrammatic form in Appendix 
7. 
The four Falster-class minelayers, which are already over 30 
years old, may be replaced with a Stanflex-class version once 
they have been taken out of service. So far, at least, the current 
naval programmes are not known to include any large 
minesweepers. 
Modernization of the five submarines which constitute the 
underwater capability of the Danish navy commenced in the 
1980's and will be completed by the end of the millennium. They 
will then be equipped with new communications, command and 
combat control systems.92 Denmark is following with interest the 
Submarine 2000 project taking place in Sweden, as this could 
offer an alternative to the modernization of the Nahrvalen class, 
at least. The main component in the protection to be provided for 
minelaying operations and any subsequent interception of landing 
attempts consists of three Niels Juel-class corvettes, which it is 
intended to modernize from the middle beginning of the current 
decade onwards, principally with respect to their anti-aircraft 
missile system. 
Denmark's coastal defence system comprises a few positions 
intended to protect the approaches from the Baltic to the Straits 
of Denmark. Two mobile four-missile naval interception batteries 
have been formed using Harpoon missiles obtained as a results 
of the scrapping of the Peder Skramm-class frigates. Since the 
missiles have a range of 100 km, each battery can cover an area of 
some 30,000 km_ and the two combined enable all the passages 
from the Baltic to the North Sea to be protected.93 
It seems that the role of the Danish navy in the new division 
of responsibilities - and command structure - of NATO is 
increasingly becoming concentrated in the Straits of Denmark 
area. In addition to the planned Stanflex vessels, modernization 
of the navy's remaining vessels will ensure that it can respond 
appropriately to any threat proceeding from the sea. A second 
field of emphasis is the development of vessels for use in the 
waters around Greenland and the Faeroes. 
The command structure of the Danish navy will gain in 
importance in the new NATO organization, in which all naval 
functions in the Baltic will be subordinated to the commander of 
the German navy or commander of the Danish navy based at 
Aarhus. 
The Danish navy will have a more prominent role in both 
BALTOPS and PfP manoeuvres, but it remains to be seen whether 
this will increase the number of Danish vessels in the northern 
Baltic. 
Trends in the complement of the Danish navy are detailed 
in Appendix 8 and its bases in Appendix 9. 
5.7 The Swedish navy 
The guidelines governing the development of the Swedish 
navy are based on government defence decisions. The current 
development plan extends to the year 1997, at which stage the 
next defence decisions will be made. The rationale behind the 
guidelines may be summed up in six performance levels based 
on potential threats to the country's security. 
The first of these is peace-keeping, which requires that the 
armed forces should be available for use as an instrument of 
crisis management. The second is the prevention of the outbreak 
of war, which requires an ability to set the threshold for an 
offensive in any given situation sufficiently high that the planned 
offensive would not be profitable relative to the resources 
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available. These two performance levels involve air defence and 
anti-aircraft functions before the commencement of actual 
hostilities, the maintenance of the inviolability of the country's 
sea area and the protection of shipping. 
The task of repelling a surprise attack also extends to the 
third performance level, at which the interception of an attack by 
specialized troops may increase the demands made on the defence 
forces. In this case the deployment of troops involves the filled 
out of the peace time operations developed to ensure territorial 
inviolability and the threat of a submarine attack to cover the 
entire length of the coast. The duties specified at this level also 
include the repelling of a surprise attack or attempted invasion 
and the defence of Northern Sweden. 
The aim at the fourth level is to prevent the enemy from 
gaining a foothold on the Swedish mainland, and those of the 
fifth and sixth levels to maintain the capacity to continue military 
operations in order to defeat the invader on one or two fronts.94 
The following naval tasks can be derived from the above 
scheme of performance levels: 
- reconnaissance and control of the sea area by means of 
penetrative air and submarine operations and other 
reconnaissance units to explore deep into the target area - 
ensuring of territorial inviolability at sea and on the coast 
- repelling of attacks from the sea and 
- protection of shipping.95 
The repelling of attacks involves extending operations to 
international waters and commencing action before the potential 
invader enters Swedish territorial waters. Any prevention of or 
interference with the invader's forward or supplementary supply 
lines will have the effect of interrupting or slowing down any 
attempt to capitalize on a bridgehead position. 
The aim is as far as possible to restrict the invader's freedom 
of action at sea temporally or spatially with respect to certain 
focal points and to secure that of the country's own troops as far 
forward and as early as possible. An engagement at sea is looked 
on as a means of gaining time for the mobilization of the national 
defence system. 
In terms of the scope of the defence system, it has been 
necessary on account of developments in naval warfare, the 
nature of potential threats and the equipment and technology 
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available, and also on account of declining resources, to 
compromise continuously on the declared aims of the 1950's and 
1960's of extending preliminary warning reconnaissance up to 
the shore from which the attack commences. The trend towards 
moving the scene of action closer to the Swedish coast is well 
reflected in make-up of the navy, with the accent shifting from 
cruisers to destroyers and frigates and eventually to coastal 
corvettes. 
This has meant a change in the basic organization of the 
navy, from a purely peace-time training system to a system 
which is constantly on the alert and operates even in peace-time 
in terms of units that corresponding to a war-time organizational 
model. The vessels of the coastal fleet in the peace-time 
organization of the Swedish navy are divided between an anti-
submarine unit and a surface interception unit, while the aim of 
the long-term planning of the navy's war-time organization, which 
already extends to the year 2011, is to establish three helicopter 
detachments, three surface interception detachments, a submarine 
detachment, three minesweeper detachments and six coastal 
brigades with both fixed and mobile weapon systems.96 
The main naval development projects in the ongoing five-
year period, up to 1997, are: 
Command structure 
The fixed regional command system of the Swedish navy is 
composed of four command sections, located at Härnösand, 
Muskö, Karlskrona and Göteborg, and a separate naval district 
centred on Malmö. The navy's "mobile leadership resources" are 
being used to created points of emphasis in command, while 
concentration of the command sections of the navy and coastguard 
service is being continued at the regional level. The reconnaissance 
and command systems will be developed to meet modern 
requirements. 
Helicopter organization 
The maritime surveillance aircraft, one from the navy and 
one from the coastguard service, will be maintained on the alert 
for anti-submarine missions. The number of helicopters will 
probably remain at the present level of 14 until the end of the 
millennium, at which point the process of replacing them will 
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commence. They will be equipped with a new anti-submarine 
torpedo and new detector systems. 
Surface defence units 
Surface defence will be organized in the form of three 
detachments. Four Göteborg-class coastal corvettes will be 
assigned to the "wartime" organization by 1.7.1997, and both of 
the Stockholm-class coastal corvettes will be retained and their 
lifespan increased by modernization before the end of the 
millennium. Two four-vessel detachments equipped with 
Norrköping-class missile boats will be maintained up to end of 
the millennium and one until 2010. Eight Hugin-class patrol 
boats have been modernized and their service life extended, four 
will be maintained at their current standard and used for their 
existing tasks, and four were decommissioned in 1994. Work will 
continue on the development of a new surface vessel class, and 
steps have also been taken towards acquiring a new type of 
vessel with a glass-fibre hull (surface combat vessel YS 2000) on 
the basis of the experiences with the experimental ship Smyge 
constructed by the camouflage technique, although differing from 
the latter in that it will be constructed on the single hull principle. 
Submarines 
12 submarines will be maintained throughout the planning 
period. Three Gotland-class vessels with air-independent Stirling 
engines based on the closed circulation of liquid oxygen and 
"city" diesel fuel, enabling submersion for as long as a week at a 
time, will be acquired and taken into operation by 1997. These 
will replace three Sjöormen-class boats by the end of the 
millennium, the first one having been launched in 1994/1995. 
The Näcken class will be modernized as far as its weapons system 
and technology are concerned, and the Västergötland class will 
similarly be modernized and its lifespan increased to cover the 
period 1997-2002. In addition, both heavy and light torpedoes 
will be introduced in 1997-2002 and work on the Submarine 2000 
development project will continue. 
Minelaying and minesweeping 
The minesweeping function will be organized into three 
regional units, one unit for each fleet, i.e. for those operating off 
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the western, southern and eastern coast of Sweden. In addition, a 
separate minesweeper unit will be established in the Gulf of 
Bothnia. Steps have already been taken to acquire the first four-
vessel series of YSB-class minesweepers, single-hull glass-fibre 
vessels with a conventional propulsion system, automatic 
machine-gun weaponry for self-defence and highly advanced 
mine searching equipment. 
The minesweeper Alvsborg, so familiar to the Finns in its 
role as a training ship, has been decommissioned, and the war-
time coastguard organization will be integrated into the 
minelaying and minesweeping units. 
Fixed coastal defence units 
The emphasis in the developing of coastal defences is on the 
creation of six coastal brigades in Stockholm, Southern Sweden, 
Gothenburg and Gotland. In addition, one mobile command 
section will be established in the brigade. The organization's 12 
interception battalions will be maintained and their anti-aircraft 
capacity developed. The anti-submarine units will be organized 
into three companies in the archipelagos of Stockholm and 
Southern Sweden. 
Mobile coastal artillery units 
The operative coastal artillery units will be organized into 
three coastal artillery batteries, heavy naval interception missile 
batteries equipped with RBS-15 missiles, and six amphibious 
battalions, three of which will receive their transport and vessels 
by 1.7.1997.97 
In accordance with the changes taking place in the security 
policy environment, the Swedish navy was provided in 1994 
with the capacities required for international cooperation, in 
which the main emphasis is regarded as being on surveillance, 
escort and minesweeping duties.98 It is the requirements imposed 
by activities of this kind that will increasingly determine its 
complement and direct its development. The minesweepers are 
designed for action far away from their home bases, as support 
vessels and hospital ships.99 
The development of the Swedish navy from the early 1980's 
to 1994 is depicted in Appendix 10. 
53 
It should be noted when evaluating this situation that the 
boats of the Stridsbåt 90 amphibious battalion are included in the 
number of landing craft equipment (each ship being capable of 
transporting some 20 men fully equipped). A total of just under 
200 boats of this type have been ordered, allowing the transport 
of slightly less than 4000 men. 
An evaluation of the complement of the Swedish navy in 
terms of ships at the end of the planning period in 2011 is given 
in Appendix 11. 
5.8 The Finnish navy 
The continuous process of change in military policy in the 
area close to Finland has not yet achieved a state of equilibrium 
in all fields or with respect to all factors. The withdrawal of the 
Russian Baltic Fleet to the head of the Gulf of Finland has increased 
the navy's dependence on the shipping lane leading from 
St.Petersburg into the Baltic via the Gulf of Finland. It is vital to 
Russian interests that this passage should be kept open under all 
circumstances. 
Statistical data for 1994 indicate that slightly over 90% of 
Finnish foreign trade takes place by sea, and in addition to 
Finland's own trade, amounting to approx. 74 million tonnes in 
that year, the harbours are also used for international transit 
traffic, which amounted to 5.6 million tonnes. Commercial 
shipments take place into and out of 53 harbours during the 
open-water period and 23 in winter with the assistance of ice-
breakers.10° 
Finland's commercial sea traffic entails some 22,000 harbour 
visits per year"', which may be calculated to imply that an average 
of some 50 vessels of 3500 rt enter the country's harbours daily. 
Although this theoretical calculation does not offer an accurate 
picture of the volume of foreign trade carried on by sea, it does 
serve as some kind of guideline. 
On account of the extent of Estonian territorial waters, sea 
traffic in the Gulf of Finland is concentrated in a narrow lane 
which is no more than six nautical miles across at its narrowest, 
in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland, off Helsinki and in the 
sound off Porkkala. In addition to the utilization of territorial 
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waters, the reorganization of maritime boundaries also affects 
the warning times available for initiating military defence 
measures. The estimated volume of sea traffic on the Gulf of 
Finland is some 100 vessels of average size per day. 
The above factors together with the extension of Finnish 
territorial waters and the fact that the country's maritime 
boundary in the Gulf of Finland also constitutes the outer limit of 
the European Union and its customs boundary, place demands 
of their own on the organization of naval defence. At the same 
time, the fact that the Gulf of Bothnia constitutes an internal sea 
within the European Union, the control and domination of the 
narrow channels leading into that area must occupy a prominent 
position in Finnish naval defence strategy. From this point of 
view the Aland Islands can be regarded as having increased in 
importance in terms of Finnish naval defence policy. 
Naval defence is that part of Finland's defence system which 
is responsible for supervising her territorial waters, preventing 
violations of her maritime boundaries, repelling attacks in the 
sea or coastal area and protecting vital sea routes. These duties 
are mainly undertaken by the navy and coastal artillery unnits, 
relying mainly on artillery power, and these may be supported 
by other ground forces, the air force, and the coastguard service, 
which is part of the National Border Guard. 
The core of the fixed component of the naval defence system 
is formed by the coastal artillery units, and its mobile element 
the navy's weapon systems. 
The duties of the Finnish navy, which are derived from 
those laid down in law for the armed forces in general, are 
the following: 
- to direct surveillance of the sea areas and carry our marine 
reconnaissance, 
- to ensure the territorial inviolability of the Finnish sea 
areas, by force where necessary, in cooperation with other 
branches of the defence forces and the border patrol 
institution, 
- to combine with other branches of the defence forces to 
intercept any attack taking place from the sea, 
- to direct and implement the protection of sea traffic, 
- to maintain a marine defence capacity, develop tactics and 
naval fighting equipment and take responsibility for 
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servicing all equipment, 
- to train the necessary naval personnel, 
- to offer assistance to other authorities as prescribed by 
law.102 
The first three of these tasks place major requirements for 
the maintenance of a naval defence capacity even in peacetime, 
while the last-mentioned is mainly connected with rescue 
operations and management of oil slicks. The general aim is that 
the navy, in combination with the fixed component of the marine 
defence system, should maintain at all time as sufficient threshold 
that its mere existence will deter any potential enemy from 
launching any action against Finland from the sea and will at the 
same time enable the country to use the sea for its own purposes. 
In cases of emergency, Finland must be capable of safeguarding 
the shipping necessary for its own foreign trade and also vessels 
belonging to foreign powers navigating in its waters. 
The interception of an attack will include attempts to gain 
time for activating the country's total defence system by causing 
losses to the agressor by the use of the navy's principal weapons 
systems. 
When the Finnish Armed Forces adopted its new 
administrative and command system on 1.1.1993, the Finnish 
navy became part of a new organization which better supports 
regional operative directions. The aim of this procedure was to 
focus administration and rationalize the use of staff. This meant 
that the Turku Naval Base and the main part of the Coastal Fleet, 
i.e. its units stationed in Turku, were combined to form the 
Archipelago Naval Command and the patrol unit of the Coastal 
Fleet based at Upinniemi together with the Helsinki Naval Base 
formed Gulf of Finland Naval Command. 
The Archipelago Naval Command, the jurisdiction of which 
extends to the southern boundary of the area covered by the Gulf 
of Bothnia coastguard service, is a regional command subject 
directly to the Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Navy. It is 
responsible for all naval action in its area, and for the maintenance 
of a'defence capability and the training of personnel in peacetime. 
Manoeuvres for the vessels of the Finnish navy are arranged 
over the whole length of the Finnish coast and throughout its sea 
area, irrespective of the above areas of jurisdiction. 
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The fleets ships are distributed between two divisions. The 
gunboats Karjala and Turunmaa together with the Helsinki-class 
missile boats constitute the missile division, and the minelayers 
Hämeenmaa and Uusimaa and the minesweepers of the Kuha 
and Kiiski classes a mine division, while transport section and 
the headquarters at Pansio form a naval battalion which provides 
support and base services. 
The Gulf of Finland Naval Command is responsible for 
operations throughout the Gulf of Finland, is likewise directly 
subordinate to the commander of the Finnish navy. The fleet's 
combat vessels are again organized into two divisions, the Rauma-
class missile boats and R-class patrol boats constitute a patrol 
division, and the Pohjanmaa, minesweeper ferry Porkkala and 
two Tuima-class vessels converted into rapid minelayers a mine 
division. 
Basic military training for conscripts is provided at the Naval 
School. Once the conscripts have obtained the basic combat skills, 
they are attached to the units of the navy's land and marine 
organizations and receive their further training, including the 
"blue line" petty officer's training, while in service. The training 
of conscripts involves three intakes annually, i.e. a total entry of 
1500 men per year, which guarantees adequate crews for all the 
ships. This system is also an optimum one as far as deployment 
is concerned, as a maximum of one half of the crew of each vessel 
can be changed at a time. This is partly achieved by virtue of the 
"in service training" provided. National service on board and for 
those receiving reserve officer or petty officer training is 330 days 
and that for persons engaged in rank and file tasks in the ground 
organization 285 or 240 days. The Naval Academy, housed on 
the historical island of Pikku-Mustasaari at Suomenlinna, is 
responsible for providing training for officers, reserve officers 
and NCO's. 
The navy's peacetime fleet comprises 30 combat vessels, as 
listed in Appendix 12, in addition to which a quite extensive 
auxiliary fleet exists for transport and servicing purposes. A 
considerable proportion of the latter, some of which are used by 
the coastal artillery, possess minelaying facilities. 
The primary weaponry used by the navy in the last war 
were mines, artillery and torpedoes. Partly on account of the 
57 
Peace of Paris and partly because of the more restricted 
role played by naval artillery nowadays as a result of the 
development of missile systems for the interception of 
surface targets, missiles, the trend is now for the main 
weapons used by the navy to be mines and missile systems. 
The mine weapons system enables exploitation of 
Finnish territorial waters to be prevented in areas which 
are beyond the range of the coastal artillery, and is designed 
to provide an adequate response to either a slowly or a 
rapidly developing state of emergency. The fundamental 
element in the system is the issuing of the decision to mine 
the territorial waters in good time, as the best cost-benefit 
ratio in creating the attack threshold can be achieved if 
most of the mines can already be laid before commencement 
of the actual attack. 
The mines currently in use are variable in origin, 
ranging from contact mines of the type already used in the 
Second World War to impulse mines containing the most 
advanced information technology. The use of a variety of 
types of mine is also an advantage as it makes the 
aggressor's minesweeping task all the more laborious and 
time-consuming.103 
The mine fleet is built up around the Pohjanmaa, 
commissioned in 1979 and currently stationed with the 
Gulf of Finland Naval Command, and the Hämeenmaa 
and Uusimaa, operating in the Archipelago Sea, which were 
completed in 1992. These are supplemented by mine ferries, 
rapid mine boats and servicing and auxiliary vessels also 
capable of laying mines. The total fleet of 14 vessels is 
capable of laying a protective shield of mines covering on 
the main approach channels from Kotka to Turku within 
24 hours.104  
The Finnish navy took its first steps in the use of missile 
systems in the 1960's, with its MTO-66 naval missile system, 
purchased from the Soviet Union. The system was adopted 
for operative use in the mid-1970's, when four Tuima-class 
missile boats were acquired. The missile system was later 
removed and the first two missile boats, the hulls of which 
are still in good condition, have been converted to fast 
minelayers. Work may also commence on converting the 
remaining two to minelayers in the next few years. 
The navy entered its second missile generation when it 
introduced the new Swedish naval missile system, the RBS-
15, in the late 1980's. A detachment of four Helsinki-class 
missile boats carrying eight missiles each was based at 
Turku, and another of four Rauma-class boats carrying six 
missiles and capable of operating in shallower water was 
introduced in the early 1990's. This latter detachment, the 
draught of which is better suited to the conditions prevailing 
off the Gulf of Finland coast and among the islands, is 
stationed at the main base at Upinniemi. 
The preconditions required for effective use of this 
naval interception missile system developed specially for 
use in Finnish coastal waters are: 
- a real-time picture of the situation and correct 
information on targets, 
- a cross-checked firing system, and 
- an ability to protect the missile boats. 
Target data are verified electronically, and the missile 
boats are able to find the target themselves if necessary. 
Depending on restrictions imposed by the area concerned, 
the range of the current missiles, which is over 70 km, will 
be exploited either by shooting along the coast or directly 
outwards from it towards the open sea. The tactical concept 
governing the use of missile firepower is quite definitely: 
shoot far - and from far away. 
The emphasis in naval fighting is created by 
subordinating the combat unit command, the mine and 
missile units and their servicing and support to the fleet 
operating in the main direction of hostilities. This emphasis 
is achieved by focusing the effects of the use of mines and 
missiles both temporally and spatially. In addition to 
protecting sea traffic, the use of minesweepers makes it 
possible to carry out the changes to be made required in 
order to adjust the emphasis of the combat units. 
Peacetime manoeuvres extending throughout the 
operative area serve to create the conditions necessary for 
controlling or contesting the use of sea areas close to 
Finland. 
The increasing international marine activity will place 
59 
further demands on the deployment of equipment and the 
training and preparation of staff. The Finnish navy has 
been participating in the Baltops manoeuvres in the Baltic 
since 1993, and its mineships have occupied a prominent 
role in this. The Pohjanmaa took part for the first time in 
1993, the Hämeenmaa in 1994 and the Uusimaa 1995. This 
naval exercise which forms part of NATO's Partnership 
for Peace programme was extended to the Baltic in 1995, 
and the mineship Pohjanmaa flew the national pennant in the 
manoeuvres held in the Straits of Denmark in October 1995. 
6 NATO IN THE BALTIC 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the agreement 
marking the foundation of which was signed on 4th April, 1949, 
constitutes a collective defence alliance as provided for under 
§51 of the United Nations general agreement, serving to unite 14 
European countries, the United States and Canada, representing 
the "western" countries of the Cold War era. 
The NATO alliance comprises two operative command 
sectors. The first of these, Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), 
with its headquarters at Norfolk in the United States, is responsible 
for a sea area extending from the North Pole to the coastal waters 
of the United States, Europe and Africa. This in turn has several 
subordinate levels of command with particular areal or functional 
responsibilities, one of which is Striking Fleet Atlantic, composed 
of an aircraft carrier unit, an anti-submarine unit and a landing 
unit, operates in the western Atlantic. 
The Atlantic fleet, STANAVFORLANT (Standing Naval 
Force Atlantic), is a permanent naval component subordinate to 
ACLANT which was established in 1967 and comprises 
destroyers, frigates and protective forces. It currently includes 
ships from Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Great Britain 
and the United States, with occasional participation from Belgium, 
Denmark, Norway and Portugal.105 
The second command sector is Allied Command Europe 
(ACE), which has had its headquarters in the town of Mons, 
Belgium, since 1966. This is responsible for an area extending 
from the northern border of Norway to the eastern border of 
Turkey, comprising a land area of almost two million square 
kilometres and a sea area of some three million square kilometres, 
containing a population of more than 320 million people. 
ACLANT and ACE belong to the group Main Command (MC) in 
the Organization's command structure. 
In accordance with NATO's most recent strategy, the task of 
the troops assigned to the NATO operative command in Europe 
is to protect the territorial inviolability of the member countries. 
Fulfillment of this task requires the development and deployment 
of a force which is capable of repelling any threat posed by the 
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strategic environment. The duties of the ACE troops have been 
defined separate for times of peace, crisis and war. 
Their peacetime duties place emphasis on the use of military 
power to guarantee the security of the member countries. The 
accent in practice is on the importance of cooperation and actions 
designed to increase mutual confidence, in order to increase the 
force's mastery overt complex situations and to alleviate or 
remove any factors constituting a military threat. The emphasis 
under exceptional conditions, which depending on how the 
situation develops, could escalate into an open military conflict, 
is on maintaining the ability to mobilize troops rapidly. Although 
the danger or possibility of an pan-European war has decreased 
on account of the developments which have taken place in the 
last few years, this eventuality cannot be excluded from the 
Organization's evaluations or defence preparations entirely. 
Troops of the NATO member countries are basically placed 
under their national command in peacetime, but are subordinate 
to NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) in 
wartime. 
NATO's operative command controls the following crisis 
management troops in peacetime: 
- ACE mobile ground forces (AMF, Mobile Force, land) 
- NATO's Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEAWF, NATO) 
- most of the air defence troops and some communication 
units. 
Under NATO's new organization and division of troops 
that came into operation on 1.7.1994, Immediate Reaction Forces 
(IRF), composed of troops of the air and ground forces of the 
AMF and regional naval units, have been formed under the 
command of SACEUR, and also Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) 
working on the same principle but under national command in 
peace time."" 
The command organization of the NATO troops in Europe 
is composed of three regional sub-commands coordinated by 
SACEUR: Allied Forces Northwest Europe (AFNORTHWEST), 
Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) and Allied Forces 
Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), all of which belong to the group 
Main Subordinate Command (MSC). 
Allied Forces Northwest Europe (AFNORTHWEST) covers 
Norway and Great Britain and related sea areas. The headquarters 
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is at High Wycombe in Great Britain and the forces are under the 
command of a British general. AFNORTHWEST is further divided 
into three branch commands: Naval Force Northwest 
(NAVNORTHWEST), Air Forces Northwest (AIRNORTHWEST) 
and Allied Forces North (PSC NORTH), responsible for ground 
action. These belong to the Principal Subordinate Command 
(PSC) in the command structure. 
Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) cover an area which 
extends 800 km southwards from the southern boundary of 
AFNORTHWEST, as far as the border with Switzerland and 
Austria. The headquarters is at Brunssum in the Netherlands, 
and the troops are led by a German general. AFCENT is further 
divided into two branch commands: Land Forces Central Europe 
(LANDCENT) and Air Forces Central Europe (AIRCENT). 
There are two IRF naval units attached to ACE. The first is 
Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED), 
established in 1992 to replace the Naval On Call Forces 
Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED), which had been operating 
since 1969, in the Mediterranean, i.e. the area of AFSOUTH. This 
comprises destroyers, frigates and corvettes from Italy, Greece, 
Turkey, and Great Britain and the United States, and thereby 
provides a framework for creating a multinational fleet under 
the command of SACEUR at times of crisis. The US 6th Fleet 
constitutes a permanent element in the fleet, while the others 
vary on an annual basis. 
Standing Naval Forces Channel (STANAVFORCHAN), 
established in 1973, operates in the area of AFNORTHWEST and 
constitutes a multinational anti-mine unit with permanent 
participation from Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Great 
Britain and attendance by ships from Denmark, Norway and the 
United States on occasions. Parts of this fleet have been in 
operation under national command in the Persian Gulf, for 
example, during the current decade.107 
The Straits of Denmark, located on the north-western flank 
of the NATO region, are vital for control over the movement of 
shipping between the Baltic and the Atlantic, and thus still occupy 
a strategically important position. 65% of the sea traffic of the 
Baltic states, which are dependent on their foreign trade, passes 
through the Straits of Denmark each year. 
63 
When NATO extends its operations to the Baltic area, this 
will take place under the command of AFCENT as far as ground 
and air forces are concerned, while AFNORTHWEST will be 
responsible for naval and naval air operations. The deployment 
of naval forces in joint exercises will be coordinated by 
AFNORTHWEST. 
The operative command responsible for the Straits of 
Denmark, Baltic Approaches (BALTAP), will be in command of 
both AFCENT and AFNORTHWEST troops when directing 
exercises in the area. This apparently problematic situation means 
in practice that powers are delegated to commander from the 
Danish or German navy. The command centres of both countries 
exchange situational reports daily, and thus maintain an 
immediate command capacity.'°8 
Experiences in recent years have led to a separate command 
structure being created for each NATO naval exercise arranged 
in the Baltic. The BALTOPS manoeuvre arranged in 1995 was 
designed and led by the commander and staff of the aircraft 
carrier unit of the 2nd Fleet, which is part of the permanent naval 
force in the Atlantic. The command infrastructure was provided 
jointly by the headquarters of Danish and German navies. 
It was decided at the NATO summit held in Brussels in 
January 1994 that open cooperation arrangements should be 
offered to countries outside NATO under a scheme to be known 
as Partnership for Peace (PIP). The aim as expressed in the initial 
documents was to create an arrangement for Europe which would 
promote cooperation between NATO, the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe and other CSCE countries, giving them an 
opportunity for cooperation at the practical 1eve1.'°9 
Cooperation is concentrated in the following major fields: 
- peacekeeping, 
- search and rescue services, 
- humanitarian aid. 
The Partnership for Peace programme also has political 
aspects, including promotion of the spread of democratic 
government to the countries engaged in it.110 A total of 24 
European states entered the programme in 1994, including Finland 
and Sweden, which did so on 9.5.1994.111 
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Manoeuvres at three levels have been organized within the 
scope of the programme and will continue to be organized in the 
future: 
- manoeuvres under the PfP programme proper, 
- multinational manoeuvres arranged by one PfP member, 
- other manoeuvres following the principles of PfP. 
Two PfP naval exercises and two exercises on land were 
organized in 1994. The first naval exercise, known as POMOREX, 
took place on the Norwegian Sea in spring 1994, involving the 
NATO countries and a unit from the Russia's Northern Fleet. 
The manoeuvres were designed by the staff of the Norwegian 
navy headquarters and involved convoy escort, search and rescue 
and trade embargo training. Finland, Sweden, Poland and 
Denmark attended in the capacity of observers. The tactical 
instructions used in the manoeuvres were distributed to 
participants which were not part of NATO in order to ensure a 
joint operative capacity in the future. 
The next naval manoeuvres under the PfP programme, held 
on the North Sea in early autumn 1994, were designed by the 
naval section of the Eastern Atlantic sub-command of the 
permanent Atlantic Fleet. These largely followed the same 
programme as the previous ones. Finland again attended in an 
observer capacity. 
The PfP programme moved to the Baltic in autumn 1995, 
with an exercise named 'Cooperative Jaguar', which involved 
most of the countries of the region, including Finland, with one 
minesweeper. Thus international naval manoeuvres have moved 
into the Baltic area on a permanent basis, i.e. they are being 
arranged close to Finnish territorial waters. The aim of these 
exercises is to improve the capacity for cooperation in the fields 
of operation covered by the Partnership for Peace programme. 
One striking element in this concerns the exceptional NATO 
command structure arrangements in the Baltic area, since the 
BALTAP group representing the Principal Subordinate Command 
(PSC) is subordinate to AFCENT, and the responsibility for naval 
operations within it is shared, the BALTAP commander 
coordinating his naval action together with the commander of 
AFNORTHWEST and through the mediation of the naval 
commander of the latter.112 This means that responsibility of 
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naval operations in the Baltic lies partly with the commander of 
AFNORTHWEST. 
As far as NATO's relation to the Baltic is concerned, no 
additions to its naval fields of responsibility have taken place as 
such. Under the loose definition contained in the Washington 
agreement, the scope of naval responsibility covers the 
Mediterranean and the Northern Atlantic north of the Tropic of 
Cancer.113 What is new is that professional articles and interviews 
connected with NATO's new command structure and the retreat 
of Soviet Russia towards the east have clearly suggested and 
specified the Baltic Sea as part of this area of responsibility. This 
is being symbolized further by the fact that manoeuvres held in 
the Baltic and visits of ships sailing under the NATO flag to the 
area are now looked on as a matter of course. 
NATO's new command structure is depicted in Fig. 7. and 
the areas of responsibility of its various headquarters in Europe 
in Fig. 8. 
The exceptional arrangements of shared responsibility are 
attributable not only to military factors but also historical and 
political ones, in that the assignment of the Baltic area solely to 
BALTAP, which is subordinate to AFCENT, could have given 
the latter an over-inflated position in NATO's command structure. 
The influence of Germany in the AFCENT command is also 
prominent, as that country holds a number of key posts, and 
Russia is sure to keep a watchful eye on this situation. The 
transfer of BALTAP to AFCENT took place specifically at 
Germany's request,114  and the signal being conveyed by the 
sharing of responsibility may concern the crucial role of the 
Baltic as an area lying between Northern and Central Europe 
and the desire to take effective measures to ensure its stability. 
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FIG 8 	NATO command structure in Europe 
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7. THE BALTIC - A NUCLEAR-FREE 
INLAND SEA? 
7.1 Nuclear and dual-purpose weapons in the Baltic 
One field of naval operations which is brought up for 
discussion from time to time is the handling of nuclear weapons 
and nuclear material in the Baltic. This problem culminates in 
three issues, the tactical nuclear weapons alleged to be carried on 
ships of Russia's Baltic Fleet, the construction of nuclear-powered 
vessels in Russian shipyards on the Baltic and their test runs, and 
the alleged sinking of nuclear-powered vessels in the Baltic. 
In the terminology of international agreements, 'nuclear-
free' means more than simply 'nuclear weapon-free', for the 
establishment of a nuclear-free sea area usually presupposes not 
only the total exclusion of nuclear weapons but also restrictions 
on the dumping of nuclear material and use of nuclear-powered 
vessels. 
In a discussion of Russian nuclear weapons in the Baltic at 
the beginning of 1993, on the most recent Norwegian version of 
Military Balance, that for 1992-1993, a Swedish daily newspaper 
announced that Russia was alleged to have had 96 tactical nuclear 
weapons in the Baltic a couple of years previously, the number of 
which had then dropped to 84 but had risen again to 128 the year 
before publication."' One should approach these claims and the 
conclusions derived from them with caution, however, as the 
tactical weapons listed in that journal are dual-purpose ones, i.e. 
they may carry either nuclear or conventional warheads. Any 
increase in the number of tactical nuclear weapons in the Baltic 
Fleet would be a contradiction of Russia's avowed decision to 
withdraw such weapons from its fleet. The following news item 
on this topic was communicated by Itar-Tass in February 1993: 
"All TACTICAL NUCLEAR weapons have been removed from 
vessels and multi-purpose submarines, as well as naval aircraft, 
and placed in centralized storage in accordance with statements 
by the USSR president of the 5th October 1991 and president of 
the RUSSIAN Federation of 29th January 1992, the press service 
of the RUSSIAN Ministry of Defence reported."116 The news item 
does not mention when the tactical nuclear weapons were 
removed, and any evaluation of trends towards a nuclear weapon-
free zone is hampered by the fact that no data are available on 
the distance between the centralized store for such nuclear 
weapons and the Russian harbours on the Baltic coast. It would 
in any case seem that the trend in the Baltic, as elsewhere, is 
towards the exclusion of nuclear weapons from naval vessels. 
Note should also be taken in this connection of NATO's 
policy statement confirmed in Rome in November 1991, which 
states that vessels or aircraft should not carry tactical nuclear 
weapons in peacetime. It can thus be assumed that NATO's own 
ships, possibly excluding those belonging to France, do not carry 
tactical nuclear weapons "in normal circumstances".117 This may 
mean, of course, that the vessels do not carry nuclear warheads 
in peacetime but that they may be equipped with them if 
international tension increases or there is a danger of war. 
In addition to European naval units, NATO's Standing Naval 
Force in the Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), also contains ships 
from the United States. Alternative armaments for the new Arleigh 
Burge missile destroyer class (DDG 51 Aegis) include Tomahawk 
cruise missiles carrying nuclear warheads, from which the 
warheads have now been removed in accordance with the above 
principle.118 
The following is a summary of the state of the Russian Baltic 
Fleet and the dual-purpose weapons carried by its vessels, which 
can be equipped either with tactical nuclear warheads or with 
conventional warheads. The largest vessels of the Russian Baltic 
Fleet have normally been cruisers and destroyers. One cruiser 
each of the Kresta I, Kresta II and Kynda classes was located in 
the area in 1986, forming the smallest of all the cruiser detachments 
in the four fleets of the Russian navy. Manoeuvres held in the 
Baltic have occasionally involved vessels from the other Soviet 
fleets, however, the largest landing manoeuvres ever organized 
there; under the name Zapad in 1981, having been marked by the 
first appearance of the aircraft carrier Kiev and the helicopter 
carrier Leningrad in the area. 
It would seem in the light of the most recent sources that 
there is now only one cruiser of the Kresta I class in operative use 
in the Baltic. Various lists also contain a light cruiser of the 
Kynda class, but this is included among the destroyers on the 
grounds of its tonnage.119 It is uncertain to what extent these light 
cruisers of the Kynda class are suitable for operative use, however 
and they have probably now been taken out of active service. 
Trends in the vessels of the Russian fleet in the Baltic and 
their main weapons systems over the last few years are shown in 
Appendix 13. 
Apart from the reduction in numbers, the most prominent 
feature is an improvement in quality as far as the new classes are 
concerned, including the new cruiser of the Admiral Ushakov 
class (former Kirov class) with nuclear weapons capability to be 
constructed at St. Petersburg, the anti-submarine frigate 
Neustrashimy constructed in Kaliningrad and the Sovremenny-
class missile-equipped destroyer built in St. Petersburg. 
The Russian navy has a wide variety of nuclear weapons 
available to it, a total of some 30 weapon types which can be used 
with a nuclear warhead: 
- there are 10 types for use by surface vessels, including 
torpedoes and other anti-submarine weapons, 
- 8 weapons systems fired from combat submarines, 
- 7 weapons systems fired from strategic submarines, 
- 6 weapons systems for use by the naval air wing. 
Western sources indicate that some 20% of these weapon 
types are available to the Baltic Fleet. 
The first torpedo with a nuclear warhead was taken into 
service in the Russian navy as early as the 1950's, for use in 
'strategic attacks' on coastal towns and ports in the west, and 
later the range of weapons was expanded to include anti-aircraft, 
anti-submarine, surface interception and coastal weapons systems. 
It has been claimed that the Whisky-class submarine U-137 which 
ran aground off Karlskrona in Sweden in October 1981 was 
carrying torpedoes with nuclear warheads, and torpedo boats 
were also shown on a programme broadcast by the Finnish TV2 
on 28.5.1993 which dealt with the nuclear waste generated by the 
Russian Northern Fleet. 
According to unconfirmed information which has emerged 
from time to time, Russia at least at one time, was using nuclear 
mines at sea. 
71 
There are a number of calibres of torpedoes that can carry a 
nuclear warhead: 650 mm, 533 mm, 450 mm and 400 mm, all 
launched from torpedo tubes. The range of the 650 mm torpedo 
which entered service in the 1980's is 50 km at a speed of 50 knots 
and as much as 100 km at 30 knots. This is fitted only on strategic 
nuclear submarines, however, so that it is not present in the 
Baltic at all. The dual purpose weapons of the Russian Baltic fleet 
are listed in Appendix 14. Any nuclear weapons that may be 
carried by this fleet are tactical in nature. 
The Juliette-class submarines carry a total of 20 Shaddock 
SS-N-3A sea target missiles with nuclear or conventional 
warheads. The missile is variously quoted as having a nuclear 
warhead of 10-350 kT with a range of 180-450 km, which suggests 
that it could be used to dominate the entire southern and central 
Baltic. The missiles are always launched in pairs from the surface, 
and also exist in a coastal artillery version. 
The Admiral Ushakov-class cruisers carries a total of 20 
Shipwreck SS-N-19 sea target missiles with an charge of 500 kT 
and a range of 500 km. The missile is evidently controlled by 
satellite. 
The Kresta I-class cruiser carries four Shaddock SS-N-3B 
dual-purpose sea target missiles capable of delivering a nuclear 
warhead of 10 kT over a range 75-100 km. The Shaddock was the 
first over the horizon (0TH) missile to be commissioned by the 
Soviet Union. The three destroyers of the Sovremenny class carry 
24 Sunburn SS-N-22 sea target missiles each, which can again be 
equipped with either nuclear or conventional warheads. The 
former has a charge of 200 kT and a range of 100 km. According 
to western handbooks, these three vessels, possibly carrying 
nuclear weapons, entered the Baltic during 1992. Ships of the 
Sovremenny class are being constructed at the northern shipyard 
in St. Petersburg at a rate of approximately one per year.'2° 
The six Krivak-class frigates carry a total of 24 Silex SS-N-14 
anti-submarine missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads. 
The nuclear warhead is of size 1-5 kT and has a range of 55 km. 
The "six corvettes of the Nanuchka class carry a total of 36 10 kT 
Siren SS-N-9 nuclear or conventional sea target missiles with a 
range of 75-100 km. 
The total number of possible nuclear weapons would thus 
indeed have risen from 96 to 128 in a couple of years between 
1991 and 1993, but it should be kept in mind that the weapons 
have a dual-purpose capacity, as stated earlier. It should also be 
noted for comparison purposes that Russia's Northern Fleet has 
a total of some 612 warheads. Since in addition to these, Russia 
has some 1300 ground-based tactical nuclear weapons and some 
1600 installed in aircraft, the dual-purpose weapons present in 
the Baltic are of minor significance quantitatively. 
The nuclear arsenal present in the Baltic will be affected in 
the near future by: 
- the planned division of the Black Sea Fleet between Russia 
and the Ukraine will increase their quantity, 
- the reduction in bases in the Baltic, until port facilities are 
available on the Bay of Luga and in the Primorsk area at the head 
of the Gulf of Finland, which will reduce their quantity. It is 
anticipated that the port on the Bay of Luga may be opened by 
the end of the decade, although this should be approached with 
some caution. 
7.2 Nuclear-powered vessels in the Baltic 
According to a survey conducted by Greenpeace, the Soviet 
Union had a total of 170 nuclear-powered ships and submarines 
in spring 1991, containing a total of 324 nuclear reactors and 
accounting for 60% of the world's marine nuclear reactors.121  
The Russians also had a training centre with nuclear reactors 
at Paldiski, on the Estonian coast west of Tallinn, whicch they 
vacated at the end of September 1995. 
The nuclear-powered vessels of the former Soviet Union 
and Russia are located in the Northern and Pacific Fleets, however, 
and there are none in use with the Baltic Fleet, although there are 
shipyards in St.Petersburg which construct nuclear-powered 
military vessels and icebreakers, notably the Admiralty Yard 
(No. 194) and the Baltic Yard (No. 189). The former has been 
specializing in the construction of Victor-class nuclear submarines 
since the 1960's, these vessels then being transferred via the 
Karelian canal network to Severodvinsk on the coast of the White 
Sea for fitting out and testing. 
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The Admiralty Yard has so far been building Victor III-
class nuclear submarines, which are powered by two pressurized 
water reactors with a thermal capacity of 100 MW. There are a 
total of 25 Victor III-class submarines in use in the Northern and 
Pacific Fleets, mainly armed with SS-N-21 cruise missiles with a 
range of 3000 km and a 200 kT nuclear warhead for striking 
ground targets. It also has anti-submarine missiles of types SS-N-
14 and SS-N-15, the former of which is a dual-purpose model for 
either nuclear or conventional warheads. There is no detailed 
information available on the extent to which the nuclear warheads 
have been removed from these. 
Work at the Baltic Yard at St.Petersburg is currently focused 
on an Arctica-class nuclear-powered icebreaker and a fourth 
nuclear battle cruiser of the Admiral Ushakov class (formerly the 
Kirov class), a ship known earlier as the Yuri Andropov, currently 
Peter the Great. This is also powered by two pressurized water 
reactors connected to oil-fired boilers to provide a combined 
system known as CONAS (Combined Nuclear And Steam). Not 
all the details of the system are known to western sources. 
The cruiser will be assigned to the Pacific Fleet upon 
completion, and it would seem from the Swedish news item 
cited above that it will carry dual-purpose weapons, which would 
account for the increase in the number of nuclear weapons in the 
Baltic, i.e. 20 SS-N-19 sea-target missiles with 500 kT warheads 
and a range of over 500 km, which would make them formidable 
weapons anywhere, even in the Pacific Ocean. It is difficult to 
estimate at what stage the vessel will be armed completely or 
partly with these warheads, or if it will ever carry them. 
The Peter the Great is of a size that it will have to be 
transferred to the ocean via the Baltic, and test runs of some kind 
can also be expected to take place close to Finnish territorial 
waters, although no notices to this effect have yet appeared in 
the military journals. Another possibility is that Russia does not 
possess the resources for completing the vessel and equipping it 
with weapon and control systems at the present time. Most 
military journals assumed that it will eventually be completed 
and fully equipped, but doubts have been expressed by the 
American Armed Forces Journal, which suggested as far back as 
its issue of June 1991 that the vessel would be stripped down and 
that the costs of this alone at that time would amount to 12 
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million roubles. The journal had obtained this information from 
the Central Television of Moscow. It seems likely, however, that 
the vessel will be completed, and that it may commence test runs 
very soon, in view of the time invested in its construction. 
It is also unclear whether the Victor-class submarines will 
use the Baltic shipyards for repairs and servicing, as this can 
equally well be done at the Severodvinsk yard or at Komsomolsk 
(Yard No. 199) some 450 km south of the mouth of the River 
Amur on the Pacific coast. 
Voices have been raised in Russia as well in favour of the 
development of an entirely nuclear-free area in the Baltic. One 
point of view is that it is in the interests of Russia is to develop 
good neighbourly relations in the region in such a way that no 
Baltic country would enter a military alliance designed to operate 
against any other. It has even been suggested that the creation of 
a nuclear-free zone to the extent that no nuclear-powered vessels 
or ones carrying nuclear weapons would operate in the Baltic or 
pass through it may be in the best interests of Russia.' 
The German weekly magazine Der Spiegel wrote in mid-
February 1993, on the basis of limited information gained from 
the German federal government, that the former Soviet Union 
had sunk at least two vessels containing nuclear reactors in the 
Baltic Sea. Archives of both the German and Russian intelligence 
services were also quoted as sources. This speculative news item 
contained the conjecture that one of the vessels may have been a 
submarine and the other a civilian ship. The magazine had no 
information on where and when the vessels had sunk or had 
been sunk. 
The news item persisted in the public eye, however, and 
information communicated by the Helsinki daily Helsingin 
Sanomat, suggested that the permanent secretary at the Ministry 
of the Environment in Estonia, Rein Ratas, had confirmed the 
sinkings, stating that the Estonians had found confirmation for 
this in a Russian environmental document.123 
The Finnish authorities have been cautious in their 
assessment of the situation, and have contented themselves with 
noting that nothing unexpected has been found in the 
measurements of radioactivity in the Baltic. Reference was made 
in their statement to the case of a Komsomolets-type submarine 
that sank in the North Atlantic in 1989, emissions from which 
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contained the radioactive isotope cesium-137, for example. Thus, 
if radioactive material had been sunk in the Baltic, this should be 
reflected in corresponding measurements. It should be noted 
here that the dumping of radioactive substances in the Baltic is 
prohibited by an international agreement signed by all the 
countries bordering on the Baltic Sea in 1974, to become effective 
in 1980. 
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ÅLAND 8. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE A
ISLANDS FOR FINNISH DEFENCE 
The province of Åland comprises some 6500 islands and 
skerries distributed between 16 local government districts, from 
Eckerö in the west to Kökar in the south-east. The islands cover a 
total area of some 500 km_ and have a population of some 25,000 
inhabitants, of whom 10,000 live in Mariehamn. The main island 
is 50 km long and some 40 km wide at the most. 
The islands have an excellent road network, with all the 
main roads surfaced, and connections between them take place 
via bridges or ferries. The port of Mariehamn enables vessels of a 
large draught to be loaded and unloaded, with immediate access 
to the road network, and the airport, located north-west of 
Mariehamn, has facilities for large transport planes. 
The outer boundary of Finland's inner territorial waters 
coincides with the national boundary on the island of Märket in 
the Aland Sea. Since the area does not have any customs route 
extending from the Åland Sea to the Gulf of Bothnia on the 
Finnish side, foreign vessels are effectively prevented under 
existing navigational rules from sailing through the Finnish sea 
area at this point. The waters around the Aland Islands are in 
any case extremely demanding and difficult to navigate, so that 
sea traffic is compelled to use the recognized channels and 
shipping lanes. 
The Aland archipelago contains a number of large islands 
which can also be regarded as significant in military terms. The 
island of Kökar, for instance, provide immediate control of the 
network of channels leading to Turku to the Archipelago Sea via 
Utö. 
Similarly, the islands of the Föglö group lying west of Kökar 
govern the routes leading to the inner islands via Lemland, while 
the main channels leading to the mainland that run east of Aland 
can be controlled from the islands of Kumlinge and Sottunga. At 
the same time the narrow but occasionally quite deep passages 
in the archipelago that forms the northern part of Åland offer 
well-protected routes for sea traffic passing through and into 
Swedish territorial waters. 
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More than 85% of Finland's foreign trade passes takes place 
via sea, and it is essential to the country's security that sea traffic 
should be maintained under all foreseeable circumstances at 
times of crisis. Likewise some 90% of our telecommunications 
with the outside world takes place through the Åland Islands, 
which thus have occupied, and always will occupy, a prominent 
position in protecting out communications towards the west. 
Similarly, the islands serve as the 'lock to the Gulf of Bothnia', 
offer an opportunity to maintain freedom of operation and free 
use of the sea in the Gulf of Bothnia with the smallest possible 
expenditure of resources. 
The question of the neutrality of the Åland Islands and 
prohibition of their use for military purposes was first raised in 
connection with the Treaty of Paris that ended the Crimean War 
of 1853-1856. An annex to the actual peace treaty was concluded 
between France, Great Britain and Russia on 30.3.1856 which 
provided that the islands will not be fortified nor will they carry 
or hold any military or naval establishment.124 
The agreement does not cover the maintaining of troops on 
the islands nor the movement of troops via them, nor does it 
apply to the territorial waters of the area, or restrict naval 
operations carried out in these waters. 
The issue of the Aland Islands has been raised in various 
forms on a number of occasions since 1856. It was above all 
Russia's aim to free herself from the regulations of 1856. The 
outbreak of the First World War in 1914 heralded a whole new 
phase in the discussions, however, when France and Great Britain, 
as signatories to the Crimean peace treaty, gave Russia a free 
hand in the question of the Aland Islands. Following the German 
advance on the eastern front, Russia commenced the construction 
of fortification on a planned line running across the Archipelago 
Sea to the Aland islands,"5 which was intended to function 
together with fortifications on the Saaremaa-Hiiumaa line to 
protect the useful base available in the archipelago against attacks 
directed towards either the Baltic Sea or the Gulf of Bothnia. The 
primary aim of this chain of fortresses was to keep the islands in 
the possession of Russia against any German attack and at least 
restrict the activity of the German navy in the northern part of 
the Baltic. Possession of these islands was also important for the 
Russians with respect to protecting their own navy. The 
unfavourable course of the war as far as Russia was concerned 
and the lack of materials prevented such operations from being 
carried out, however. 
The construction of these forts aroused much unrest in 
Sweden, of course, as they greatly undermined Swedish defence 
prospects. Most of all it was feared that the chain could be used 
as a base for launching a naval operation against Sweden. 
The question of the Aland Islands progressed to yet another 
new era with the Russian Revolution of March 1917, which 
aroused demands for their incorporation into Sweden.126  With 
the rise of the White troops against the Russians in Finland, and 
with the increasing hostility of the Russian troops stationed on 
the Åland Islands, to the extent that it was feared that the situation 
would become totally out of hand, the inhabitants of the islands 
together with the Swedes resolved to take advantage of these 
developments. Thus a popular movement grew up for the 
separation of Åland from Finland and its association with Sweden. 
The movement even submitted a petition to this effect to the 
King of Sweden. 
As the result of the dispatching of a Swedish expeditionary 
force to the islands on 13.-14.2.1918, both the Russians and the 
Red and White troops retreated leaving Sweden in sole control. 
The situation changed again when German 'Sonderverband 
Ostsee' naval detachment reached Aland on 3.3.1918. Although 
Colonel von Bonsdorff, the new Governor appointed by the 
Finnish government, arrived at his post on 9.3.1918, the Swedish 
troops remained on the islands until the end of May.127 
An addition was made into the First World War peace treaty 
signed at Brest-Litovsk on 3.3.1918 under which the forts 
constructed on the Aland Islands should be destroyed and other 
military questions pertaining to them resolved by means of a 
separate agreement between German, Russia, Finland and 
Sweden, to the other countries of the Baltic could also be 
signatories. 128 
The ensuing agreement on the destruction of all the forts on 
the Åland islands was concluded between Finland, Sweden and 
Germany in the spring of 1919, and Sweden sent a torpedo 
cruiser to the islands, for example, to supervise the demolition 
work.129 This active role played by Sweden has later been 
evaluated as having prolonged discussion of the Aland question, 
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which was evidently the main purpose of the Swedes' presence 
on the islands. 
As a result of discussions in the League of Nations on 
27.6.1921, in which it was concluded that Finland had sovereign 
control over the Aland Islands and that the question of neutral 
status and the prohibition of fortifications should be solved 
separately, a meeting was summoned in Geneva at which 
authorized representatives of Finland, Sweden, Germany, 
Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Great Britain, France and Italy 
were to conclude an agreement regarding the islands. The final 
agreement was signed in Geneva on 20.10.1921 and ratified by 
Finland on 28.1.1922.130 
The agreement defines a zone for the Åland Islands in which 
the sea boundary is to run three nautical miles from the coast, 
and the third article, prohibiting fortifications on the islands, 
states that no military or naval establishment or base or any 
other device to be used for military purposes should be 
maintained or constructed within the zone defined in the 
agreement. Demilitarization of the area also applied to the sea 
areas, although the territorial waters of three nautical miles were 
defined only for the purposes of demilitarization and neutral 
status and did not affect Finland's right to enforce its general 
principle of territorial waters of width 12 nautical miles. 
As far as the neutral status of the islands is concerned, the 
agreement lays down that no foreign ground, naval or air forces 
shall enter the area or remain there, and the manufacture, 
importation, transit conveyance and export of weapons and 
military supplies shall be specifically prohibited. 
It does state, however, that Finland shall be entitled to keep 
a regular police force in the zone in peacetime in order to maintain 
general order and security. In addition, Finland may move armed 
troops there in cases of emergency and station them there 
temporarily if they are essential for maintaining law and order. 
Furthermore, Finland retains the right to send one or two 
light naval surface vessels to the islands from time to time for 
inspection purposes, in which case they may temporarily anchor 
in the coastal waters. In addition to these vessels, Finland is 
entitled to use other surface vessels of a total tonnage not 
exceeding 6000 tonnes in the coastal zone and maintain them 
there temporarily if particularly pressing factors require this. 
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Finnish air force planes are allowed to fly over the zone, but 
landing is prohibited except in an emergency. 
The agreement was concluded at a time when anchoring 
could be regarded as denoting both anchoring off harbours and 
landing points and also attachment to a quay, as anchors were 
almost used almost without exception in the latter situation as 
well. 
An article by Erik Castrén discusses the possibility of using 
one or two light naval vessels for inspection purposes (Article 4 
in the agreement): "Finland has the right to inspect the neutral 
area from time to time in peacetime using one or two surface 
vessels which may call in at the harbours of the islands and 
anchor temporarily in other places as well. These inspections are 
also necessary so that the crews of naval vessels can become 
familiar with these dangerous waters and thereby be in a position 
to defend the islands' neutrality effectively. Light vessels maybe 
taken here to denote ships other than combat vessels."131  
Castrén also discusses the condition regarding visits by larger 
vessels, referring to the well-known legal expert Rafael Erich 
who considers in one constitutional work what the nature of 
these 'particularly pressing factors' might be. Erich writes that: 
"Such pressing circumstances may arise from important naval 
manoeuvres, a visit by the President of Finland to the islands or 
some visit of an a highly official nature, etc. The Finnish 
Government may even grant a foreign power permission to send 
one naval vessel into the neutral zone for a limited period of 
time, whereupon the agreement does not impose any restriction 
on the size of such a vessel."132 Erich's interpretation has been 
considered too liberal in more recent commentaries, particularly 
as far as demilitarization is concerned.133 
It is indeed specifically stated in Article 4 that the Finnish 
Government shall not be entitled to grant permission for more 
than one naval vessel belonging to a foreign power to enter the 
islands within the zone or anchor there temporarily. 
Finland's rights in the case of war are discussed in Article 6, 
which lays down that the zone mentioned in the agreement shall 
be regarded as a neutral area in the case of war and shall not be 
used either temporarily or directly for any purposes connected 
in any way with military action. Should the Baltic become the 
scene of war, however, Finland shall be entitled to mine the 
territorial waters of Åland temporarily and to take such naval 
measures as are absolutely essential in order to safeguard the 
neutrality of the zone. Should any sudden attack made on the 
Aland Islands or on the Finnish mainland via them endanger the 
neutrality of the zone, Finland shall take all the measures within 
the zone that are required in order to stop or intercept the 
aggressor.' 
Of the signatories to the 1856 treaty, Russia was not among 
the original parties to the agreement of 1921, for the reason that 
the agreement was concluded at a stage when Russia was not yet 
a member of the League of Nations. Although the Soviet Union 
did not become a party to the agreement even at a later stage, it 
was compelled to attend discussions of the Aland question once 
it had become a permanent member of the Council of the League 
of Nations. 
As political tension increased in Europe in 1939, Finland 
made an attempt to annul the prohibition on fortifying the Aland 
Islands,135  as demilitarization and the absence of fortifications 
were regarded as weakening Finland's opportunities for taking 
the necessary defence measures in the Aland area. A document 
known as the Stockholm Plan was drawn up in January 1939 as a 
result of negotiations with Sweden'136 which would have 
permitted Finland to take all necessary military action in an area 
south of a parallel passing through the southern tip of the main 
island. The plan was submitted to the signatory states of 1921, 
who all indicated their approval. The Soviet Union was opposed 
to the defence arrangements implied by the plan, however, and 
prevented its acceptance by the Council of the League of Nations 
early in 1939, exercising the right of veto that it had by virtue of 
its permanent membership. This led to the plan being abandoned 
completely. 
Finland was compelled to mine the waters of the Aland 
Islands itself during the Winter War of 1939-1940 and to fortify 
and equip the individual islands under the agreement of 1921. 
Proper notification was given both to the League of Nations and 
to the signatory states, all of which indicated their approval. 
The Soviet Union took up the question of the Aland Islands 
after the Winter War, in June 1940, suggesting that they should 
be demilitarized or the fortification work continued jointly with 
Soviet forces. Finland decided to demolish the fortifications, 
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rejecting all suggestions of military cooperation with the Soviet 
Union. 
The Russians devised a plan in autumn 1940 for capturing 
the Aland Islands. This document, known as the Plan of Rear- 
Admiral Panteleyev and dated 10.9.1940, contains data on a 
landing detachment of the size of a division to be reinforced with 
support units. The intention was to land three battalions, a total 
of 2661 men, by means of a paratroop operation and bring in all 
the necessary support arms by means of transport vessels. The 
two other landing detachments were to be transported by sea, 
the second consisting of a total of 11 transport vessels and some 
6500 men, and the third one primarily of support weapons. The 
landing would placed a total of 16,300 men of the Soviet armed 
forces on the islands.137 
An agreement on "the Åland Islands Zone" was signed 
between the Soviet Union and Finland on 11.10.1940.138 Under it 
the Soviet Union was granted the right to maintain its own 
consular office on the islands, which in addition to normal 
consular duties was to supervise compliance with the 
demilitarization and fortification regulations. The agreement 
ensured the preservation of military restrictions. 
During the Continuation War, Finland again mined the 
territorial waters of Aland and fortified its islands, duly reporting 
these measures to the signatories to the agreement of 1921. 
According to Article 9 of the Interim Peace Treaty concluded 
between Finland, the Soviet Union and Great Britain in Moscow 
in 1944, all the conditions of the agreement of 1940 were to be 
enforced, and under Article 5 of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 
the Aland Islands remained demilitarized in accordance with the 
practices prevailing at that time. 
The ongoing process of change in the current military 
situation has given rise to new uncertainty factors in the area 
adjacent to Finland. The loss of Russian naval bases in areas close 
to Finland and the low standards of naval defence in the Baltic 
countries are variables which help to shape the naval and military 
environment in which Finland finds itself. This means that any 
pressure for change emanating from the Baltic area will affect 
first the southern coast of Finland and the Åland Islands. 
The Åland Islands are gaining in importance in terms of the 
task of guaranteeing the freedom of movement of the Finnish 
navy and of merchant shipping, while at the same time the end 
of the confrontation between the military alliances and the political 
changes that have taken place in the southern Baltic have shifted 
the interface between the parties in a possible conflict in the 
region northwards to the mouth of the Gulf of Finland and the 
Åland Sea.139  
As Finland's permanent peacetime defence system does not 
extend to the area of Aland entirely or in a sovereign manner, 
apart from the coastguard service, mobile systems will continue 
to play a prominent role. Surveillance and defence of the Åland 
area can be most rapidly intensified by means of air force and 
naval units. 
The role and significance of Finland's naval defence in the 
area of the Aland Islands, to which the country's fixed defence 
system does not extend in peacetime, is a matter of undeniable 
importance. The islands could be defended much better with a 
greater centralization of resources, of course, but this would 
presuppose a preliminary deployment of troops to be effected in 
peacetime, which is not possible under current agreements and 
with their present interpretations.''° 
The status of the Aland Islands may begin to arouse interest 
once more should a new security policy situation emerge in 
which Finland's independence of all military alliances is likely to 
alter as the defence dimension of the European Union gains in 
depth and moves towards a joint defence goal mentioned in the 
Maastricht agreement. Should this trend carry Finland towards 
membership of the defence pillar of the European Union, the 
Western European Union (WEU) and of NATO, the position of 
the Åland Islands would have to be evaluated from points of 
departure which differ quite radically from the situations on 
which the agreements of 1921, 1940, 1944 and 1947 were founded. 
9. CONCLUSIONS 
The current strategic situation in the Baltic resembles to 
some extent the situation that existed prior to the Second World 
War as far as Russia is concerned, with the exception that the 
Kaliningrad oblast is now part of the Russian Federation, and 
not of Germany as was Eastern Prussia. One common element is 
the existence of a regional uncertainty factor. 
The Baltic Sea and the area of the Baltic states in particular 
can still be regarded as being of vital importance for Russia on 
political, economic and military grounds. As indicated above, 
the Baltic and the harbours of the Baltic states and Finland occupy 
a prominent position in her foreign trade, just as the Baltic states 
and the Baltic Sea also form the outermost zones of the military 
defences protecting the core areas of Mother Russia. 
It is for these reasons that Russia will continue to maintain a 
military presence in the Kaliningrad area and a fleet in the Baltic 
which, although lighter than earlier, is sufficient in relation to the 
balance of naval power in the area. The decrease in numbers will 
be compensated for by more efficient vessels and naval air forces. 
The fact that decisions regarding the reduction in the number 
of Russian vessels in the Baltic and the use of lighter vessels were 
made before the radical changes in the Soviet Union/Russia is 
due to the long planning and manufacturing times involved in 
the shipbuilding programmes. The trend was simply accelerated 
by economic factors and the rapidity with which the changes 
have taken place. 
The overwhelmingly military interests of the Russians in 
the Kaliningrad area do little to promote the development of 
civilian industries or infrastructure. On the other hand, there are 
signs that the shipping of goods via the old export harbours in 
the Baltic states is developing, which will reduce the pressure on 
Russia to build harbours in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland. 
It should also be noted from this trend that the golden "transito" 
era for the Finnish harbours will not last indefinitely, as transit 
traffic via Finland will decrease in the medium and long term as 
Russia's own harbours and the developing harbours of the Baltic 
states begin to operate at full capacity. 
It will be particularly interesting to observe Germany's 
policy in the Baltic, as any demonstrable attempt by that country 
to focus its maritime interests towards the northern part of the 
Baltic would be of major importance in terms of naval strategy. 
Germany has so far pursued a very cautious line in the Baltic, 
however. She acquired possession of military harbours and 
servicing facilities upon reunification, of course, and the 
development of one of these, Warnemunde, as a corvette base 
may be taken to indicate some kind of movement towards the 
east, but even so the emphasis in the naval activities of the united 
Germany cannot be said to have shifted or be clearly shifting 
towards the Baltic area, in spite of the fact that some 2/3 of the 
country's bases and support systems are located on the Baltic 
coast. The attachment of the naval command in the Baltic area to 
NATO's AFNORTHWEST group is also an indication of the 
political caution being exercised by Germany in its role in the 
Baltic. 
The increasing interest being shown in the Baltic by NATO 
can be regarded as a natural consequence of its more clearly 
defined command structure relations and fields of responsibility 
in this region, and also of the termination of the Cold War and 
the expansion of NATO's territorial responsibility eastwards along 
the south coast of the Baltic. The naval manoeuvres organized 
for various purposes as part of NATO's Partnership for Peace 
programme will continue to take place on a regular basis. A 
change in the political climate and the entry of Finland and 
Sweden into membership of the EU will also make western 
vessels a more natural and common sight in manoeuvres 
organized in the Baltic. 
Poland has frequently expressed a clear desire in recent 
years to join NATO and receive security guarantees from this 
organization. This would in many ways be difficult and 
complicated, however, as NATO and its leading country the 
United States do not want to impose any additional strain on 
their relations with Russia, which has frequently expressed its 
dissatisfaction with NATO's expansion, especially since any 
provocation of this kind would make President Yeltsin's internal 
policy position more difficult by allowing his opponents to point 
to weakness on his part and a threat to Russia's interests. 
On the other hand, NATO cannot afford to give the 
impression that Russia can exercise some kind of power of veto 
over its expansion decisions. NATO has also clearly 
communicated this point of view to Russia. Polish membership 
of NATO would change the military balance of power throughout 
the Baltic significantly, as it would give NATO a land frontier 
with Russia in the Kaliningrad area, an area which in any case 
contains a major concentration of military forces. 
This change in situation would also be dramatic in terms of 
naval strategy. The headquarters of the Russian Baltic Fleet would 
be immediately adjacent to an area occupied by NATO forces, 
and both Kaliningrad and the Baltic states would fall into the 
area covered by NATO short-range operations. The situation 
would be problematic for the Russians even in a mild international 
political climate, and perhaps quite intolerable. The incorporation 
of Poland in NATO as a full member against Russia's will would 
introduce new tensions into the central Baltic. 
Another fact connected with the expansion of NATO towards 
the east is that it would be difficult at this stage to extend the 
security guarantees which automatically follow membership to 
the Baltic countries, at least. The lack of a military infrastructure 
makes the area difficult to defend without any preliminary 
preparations. 
As the focus of naval strategy shifts to the northern Baltic, 
the position of the Aland Islands will become more crucial. Its 
demilitarized status has both an international political dimension 
and a military dimension, and these are connected one with the 
other. 
Although recent discussions have clearly indicated that the 
Aland Islands have gained in military importance as the situation 
in the Baltic has altered, the Finnish government feels that there 
is no international political need to alter the official status of the 
islands. 
Although Finland's extension of her territorial waters has 
increased the area falling under the self-government powers 
invested in Aland, this will not at least directly affect the position 
of the demilitarized zone, at least not directly. Indirectly, however, 
it may have some impact as the zone will now occupy as smaller 
proportion of the Finnish sea area, which will extend outwards 
for 12 nautical miles. 
EYA 
What would be the position of the Åland Islands in Finland 
if the latter were a member of NATO and WEU? In its current 
form, the province would be an anomaly in any defence union, 
as it would house the consulate of a foreign power which has a 
contractual right to supervise the maintenance of the islands' 
demilitarized status, an heirloom from the Second World War. 
The people of Åland Islands have fairly openly aimed at 
emphasizing the independence of action on the international 
scene. They have received unreserved support from Russia in 
the maintenance of demilitarized status, to the extent that a 
delegation from the islands has visited Russia to discuss questions 
of security policy pertaining to the islands. Representatives of 
foreign countries and their minorities have also visited the islands 
to learn about the position that they occupy. 
There are still some open questions in the Baltic in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, such as the future of the 
Kaliningrad area and the position of the Aland islands. Possible 
NATO membership for Poland on the one hand or Finland and 
Sweden on the other would raise these questions at least to a 
level above that of mere discussion. A difficult situation would 
arise, for instance, if the national interests of Finland, expressed 
in a desire for membership of a defence union, were to prove 
incompatible with the demilitarized position of the Åland Islands. 
In this case the national interest would presumably be paramount. 
NOTES 
1 U.S. Naval Proceedings/Naval Review 1991, p. 184 
2 The Military Balance 1990/1991 and 1991/1992. The International Institute 
for Strategic Studies (IISS). 
3 Admiral Vladimir Yegorov, Helsingin Sanomat 3.3.1993 
4 The Military Balance 1993-1994, p. 103. 
5 Jane's Fighting Ships, 1989/1990. 
6 Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 14, no. 15,13.10.1990, p. 690. Soldat und 
Technik 11/1990, pp. 64-68. Maritime Defence, 8/1992. 
7 Morten Bomholt Nielsen, Sovjetmarinen i Östersjön, Institut for 
Forsvarsstudier 4/1991. The Military Balance 1994/1995. 
8 Sydsvenska Dagbladet, 20.1.1993. 
9 Reference is made to the issue in a wider context, e.g. by Pekka Visuri in his 
article 'Sicherheitspolitische Konsequenzen der Vereinigung Deutschlands 
- Eine Bewertung aus nordischer Sicht' in Nordeuropa und die deutsche 
Herausforderung, Nomos-Verlag, 1994, p. 107, see also an article by Mikko 
Viitasalo and Bo Österlund entitled Itämeren meristrateginen tilanne 
muuttuu (A change in the strategic situation in the Baltic Sea), Ulkopolitiikka 
4/92, p. 44 (in Finnish) 
10 Svenska Dagbladet, 26.3.1993. The article contains an evaluation of the 
visits of NATO vessels to the Baltic, provided by Colonel Jan Blomqvist, a 
Swedish intelligence expert. 
11 Report of the Meeting of the Baltic Pilotage Authorities Commission in 
Lubeck 23.-24.5.1984. Contained in Osmo Tuomi: Itämeri ja sen lähialueet 
Varsovan liiton turvallisuusjärjestelmässä (The Baltic and its nearby areas 
in the security system of the Warsaw Pact), Aseidenriisunnan 
neuvottelukunta (ARNEK) 1986, A/4, p. 11 and Appendix 6. 
12 Helsingin Sanomat 27.7.1993. An article in Finnish referring to a survey 
carried out by the Technical Research Centre of Finland. 
13 Lecture given by Dr. Georgy A. Levikov: The Russian Port Policies and 
Future Plans in the Baltic Sea Area, at seminar on sea traffic in the Baltic 
held in Naantali on 8.-9.9.1993, contained in the report The Baltic Sea in 
International Bulk Transport, Publications of the Centre for Marine 
Studies of the University of Turku, A 13, Turku 1993, pp. 81-83. 
14 Publications on the Baltic Sea Area, A Selected List, Compiled by Riitta 
Siunala, Library of Parliament, Helsinki 1990. 
15 Fishing in the Baltic aroused discussion among Finns in July 1994, 
particularly in connection with the meeting of Nordic prime ministers at 
Kerimäki in Finland. The basic agreement governing fishing in the Baltic 
(and the Belts) is the 'Convention of 1973 on Fishing and Conservation of 
Living Resources in the Baltic Sea and the Belts' concluded in Gdansk in 
1973. Contract series 40/1974 of the Finnish law collection. 
16 The Baltic Sea Area, A region in the making, Contributions from 16 authors, 
Editors Sverre Jervell, Mare Kukk and Pertti Joenniemi, Sarpstorg, 
November 1992. The work includes articles by Ola Timander: The strategic 
significance of the Nordic-Baltic region, pp. 211-229, and Pekka Visuri: The 
changing political and strategic status of the Baltic region, pp. 230-238. 
17 Flådestrategier og nordisk sikkerhetspolitik, Bind 1, Det sikkerhets- og 
nedrustnindspolitiske udvalg (SNU) 1986, Ko/benhavn 1986, p. 64. 
18 Voipio, Aarno (editor), The Baltic Sea, Elsevier Oceanography Series, 30, 
Amsterdam 1981, p. V 
19 SNU (see note 1), p. 64 
20 Ibid. p. 64-65 
21 Mälkki, Pentti and Tamsalu, Rein, Physical Features of the Baltic Sea, 
Finnish Marine Research No, 252, Helsinki 1985, pp. 9-10. The publication 
contains more detailed and accurate data than the SNU report regarding 
aspects such as sea depths. 
22 SNU, p. 66. 
23 Seinä, Ari and Palosuo, Erkki, Itämeren suurimpien vuotuisten jääpeitteen 
laajuuksien luokittelu 1720-1992 (Classification of the maximum annual 
extents of sea ice on the Baltic in 1720-1992), Meri No. 20, Maritime Research 
Institute, Helsinki 1993, p. 5 (in Finnish). In the case of the winter of 1946-
1947 reference is made in the above publication to an investigation by 
H.Simojoki entitled 'Eisverhältnisse in den Finnland umgebenden Meeren 
in den Wintern 1946-50' (Publications of the Maritime Research Institute 
no. 154, Helsinki 1952), in which it is stated that 'Ende Februar durfte die 
Ostsee zum grässten Teil mit dunnem Eis bedeckt sein' (Most of the Baltic 
Sea could easily be covered by thin ice at the end of February) 
24 Ibid. pp. 9-10. 
25 For temperatures and salinity of the Baltic, see e.g. Haapala, Jari and 
Alenius, Pekka: Temperature and Salinity Statistics for the Northern Baltic 
Sea 1961-1990, Finnish Marine Research No. 262, Helsinki 1994, pp. 51-121. 
26 SNU, p. 66 
27 Amendment to the law regarding the boundaries of Finland's territorial 
waters (981/1995). 
28 Agreement concluded by an exchange of notes between the Estonian 
embassy in Helsinki and the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4.5.1994. 
29 Agreement concluded between the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom 
of Sweden on 2.6.1994 regarding the determination of the boundary between 
the Finnish continental shelf and fishing zone and the Swedish economic 
zone in the Åland Sea and northern Baltic Sea. 
30 Customs Law (573/78) §1. Printing office of the Finnish Council of State 
1978. 
31 Law 981/95, see reference 1. 
32 Report of the meeting of the Baltic Pilotage Authorities Commission in 
Lubeck, 23.-24.5.1984. The source mentions that data for 1982 were not 
available, nor do the statistics specify vessel sizes and tonnages, for example. 
33 E.M.Mahlin, Development of Russia's Foreign Trade Cargo Flows through 
Baltic Sea Ports, Expert Meeting on Ports and Maritime Transport, November 
14-15.1994, Council of the Baltic States, Publications of the Maritime Training 
Centre, University of Turku, A 18, Turku 1995, pp. 4-12 
34 Juhani Vainio, Vladimir Segercrantz, The role and objectives of research, 
Sheets of ongoing research projects of Baltic region, Expert Meeting on 
Ports and Maritime Transport, November 14-15, 1994, Publications of the 
Maritime Training Centre, University of Turku, A 18, Turku 1995, pp. 97-108 
35 Levikov, see reference 13 in the Introduction 
36 Mahlin, see above. 
37 Mahlin, see above. 
38 Mahlin, see above. 
39 Changes in the flow of goods to and from Russia in the Baltic area from 
Finland's point of view, Publications of the Ministry of Transport 8/94, 
Helsinki, 1994, p. 7 
40 See above, pp. 7-8, see also p. 28 
41 Matthew Kaminski, Baltic ports search for new role as gateway to Russia, 
Financial Times, February 17,1995. See also Helsingin Sanomat of 28.3.1995 
'Baltia lastaa länteen' (The Baltic loads up for the west). 
42 Christian Wellmann, Market Place or Garrison? On the Future of the 
Kaliningrad Region, Projektverbund Friedenswissenschaften Kiel, Kiel, Juni 
1994, p. 24 
43 Kauppalehti, OPTIO, no. 6, 23.3.1995, pp. 46-47 
44 Norman Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy 1991. Fifth Edition. 
45 U.S. Naval Proceedings, Naval Review 1991/1992 
46 Morskoj Sbornik, 7/1992 
47 U.S. Naval Proceedings, Naval Review 1992/1993. 
48 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1993, October 1993 
49 Naval Forces VI/1994, The Withdrawal of the Russian Baltic Fleet. 
50 Captain (Navy) Victor Potvorov, Naval War College Review II/1994, 
National Interests, National Security and the Russian Navy. 
51 The Military Balance 1994-1995 in Northern Europe, The Norwegian Atlantic 
Committee, 1995. 
52 Vårt Försvar, 2/1989, pp. 8-10. 
53 Morskoj Sbornik 7/1993, Admiral Valentin Selivanov, Head of the Russian 
Naval Headquarters. 
54 Naval Force IV/1993, Admiral Felix Gromov, Commander of the Russian 
Naval Forces, Reforming the Russian Navy. 
55 U.S. Naval Proceedings/Naval Review 1991. 
56 U.S. Naval Proceedings, The Soviet View, December 1991. 
57 Marin Nytt 1993, Ryska Östersjöflottan utvecklar sina baser. 
58 Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1994, The Russian Navy in Transition. 
59 U.S. Naval Proceedings, March 1995, World Navies in Review: Russia. 
60 Ibid. 
61 U.S. Naval Proceedings, March 1995, July 1993 
62 Ibid. 
63 NAFO IV/1993. 
64 U.S. Naval Proceedings/Naval Review 1991. 
65 U.S. Naval Proceedings, August 1993, The Russian Naval Review. 
66 Marinforum no. 9/1994, Interview with Admiral Vladimir Yegorov, Die 
baltische Flotte. 
91 
67 Ibid. 
68 The Military Balance 1984-1985, International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(IISS), London, The Alden Press, Oxford, 1994, p. 27 
69 See Jane's Fighting Ships 1992-1993, edited by Richard Sharpe, pp. 466-473 
70 The Military Balance 1986-1987, p. 53 
71 On this, see Military Balance 1989-1990, p. 44 and p. 50 and 1990-1991, p. 51 
72 The Military Balance 1990-1991, p. 51 
73 On this, see The Military Balance 1987-1988, p. 46 and p. 52 
74 Jane's Fighting Ships 1994-1995, edited by Richard Sharpe, pp. 501-512 
75 Jane's Defence Weekly (JDW), Vol 22 No. 16, 22 Oct 1994, p. 10 
76 The Military Balance 1994-1995, p. 97, see references 26 and 29 above. 
77 See references 26 and 31 above. 
78 See references 31 and 32 
79 See reference 32 
80 Marineforum no. 10/1994, Die Flotte, Wandel, Einsatz, Entwicklung. 
81 Soldat und Technik 3/1993, Die Marine auf dem Weg in das nächste 
Jahrhundert, Vice-Admiral Hein-Peter Weyher. 
20 Soldat und Technik 11/1991, Flotte 2005, Die Marine auf dem Weg in 
die Zukunft, Fregattenkapitän d.R. Volker-Herbert Burggraf. 
83 Marineforum 10/1994, Die Flotte, Wandel, Einsatz, Entwicklung. 
Marineforum 3/1995, Unsere Marine auf Kurs 2005. 
84 Truppenpraxis 4/1993, Die maritime Dimension unserer Sicherheit ist 
gewachsen. 
85 Marineforum 3/1995, Unsere Marine auf dem Weg in das nächste 
Jahrhundert, Vice-Admiral Hein-Peter Weyher. 
86 Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1992, Flag officer Denmark, Rear-
Admiral Knud Borck. 
87 Navy International, Modernising Denmark's Navy, April 1992. 
88 Naval forces NAFO 1987-1989, Jane's Defence Weekly, May 1990 
89 International Defence Review, 1/1993, Denmark's naval modernization, 
survival through innovation. 
90 Standard Flex, The Future Multi-role Ship, Operating a Fleet of Standard 
Flex Units, Rear-Admiral Knud Borck, pp. 14-15 in a dock brochure of 
March 1992. 
91 See reference 47, p. 15. 
92 Maritime Defence, May 1992, The Danish Stanflex 300, p. 147. 
93 Jane's Defence Weekly, September 1994, Danish Defences get land-based 
Harpoon, p. 5 
94 Operative plan drawn up by the Commander-in-Chief of the Swedish 
Navy, entitled 'Nya Hårda Bud', see separate appendix to Marin Nytt 6/ 
1992, publication of the information section of the Swedish Defence 
Headquarters. 
95 Head of the Swedish Navy headquarters Major-General Lars Persson, The 
Swedish Navy Today, Navy International, January/February 1993. 
96 As reference 51. 
97 Revised operative plan drawn up by the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Swedish Navy, entitled 'Försvarspropositionen', November 1993, Marin 
Nytt 1/1994, Publication of the information section of the Swedish Defence 
Headquarters. 
98 Marinen i Försvarsmaktsplan 1995, Marin Nytt 6/1994, Publication of the 
information section of the Swedish Defence Headquarters. 
99 'Marinen och internationell verksamhet': statement made by Rear-Admiral 
Frank Rosenius, Commander of the Swedish Coastal Fleet, in Marin Nytt 
6/1994, Publication of the information section of the Swedish Defence 
Headquarters 
100 Sea traffic between Finland and foreign countries 1994, Maritime traffic 
statistics published by the Maritime Institute 5/1995. 
101 See above. 
102 Mariner's Handbook 1993, The Finnish Navy, Tasks of the navy. 
103 Visa, Sakari, Vice-Admiral, Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Navy, Our 
navy relies on mines and missiles, Kylkirauta no. 2/1993, p. 25 
104 Visa, Sakari, Vice-Admiral, interview with the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Finnish Navy, entitled 'Finland's secret weapon', Suomen Kuvalehti no. 
46,18.11.1994, p. 29 (in Finnish). 
105 North Atlantic Treaty Organization 'NATO HANDBOOK', Nato 
Information and Press Office, 1110 Brussels, Belgium 1992. 
106 Allied Command Europe, ACE Backgrounder, Public Information Office, 
B-7010 SHAPE, Belgium 1994. 
107 Tidskrift i Sjöväsendet, Östersjöns strategiska betydelse från NATO:s 
synvinkel, Kungliga Örlogsmannasällskapets publikation, 157. årgången, 
2. häftet 1994. 
108 Norwegian Defence, The Way Ahead in the Northern Region, General Sir 
Garry Johnson, CIC Allied Forces Northern Europe, Review published by 
the Norwegian Defence Association, 1993 
109 Building a Partnership for Peace, Gebhardt von Moltke, NATO Review 
No. 3, June 1994, p. 3. 
110 NATO Partnership for Peace, Publication of the NATO Information and 
Press Office, NATO Summit, January 1994, pp.  1-3. 
111 Soldat und Technik, Sicherheitspolitische Umschau, 1/1995, p. 7. 
112 David Miller, in his paper New Look for European Command, International 
Defence Review 5/1994, p. 31. 
113 The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., 4.4.1949, Article 6: 'The North 
Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer'. The treaty has been published 
in a number of collections and manuscripts, see The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, Facts and Figures, 11th edition, Brussels, NATO 1989, p. 377. 
114 See Miller above, p. 30. 
115 Sydsvenska Dagbladet, 20.1.1993. 
116 Itar-Tass 4.2.1993. 
117 The Alliance's Strategic concept, Part IV, Section 57. The document was 
approved in a NATO meeting in Rome on 7.-8.11.1991. The passage reads: 
"Sub-strategic nuclear weapons will, however, not be deployed in normal 
circumstances on surface vessels and attack submarines." 
118 The Military Balance 1993-1994, International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(IISS), Brassey's, Amersham, Bucks, 1993, p. 237. 
93 
119 See above, p. 103 
See also Militaerbalansen 1993-1994, Norsk utgave ved Den norske 
Atlanterhayskomite, Aurskog, 1994, p. 47, pp. 211-213. 
120 Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 21, No 17, 30 April 1994, p. 3. 
121 Christensen, Hans, Soviet Nuclear-Powered Ships and Submarines, 
Greenpeace, Nuclear Information Unit, Stockholm, September 1991. 
122 Potvorov, Victor, National Interests, National Security and the Russian 
Navy, Naval War College Review, Vol. XLVII, No. 4, Autumn 1994, pp. 62-
63, The author is a Captain in the Russian Navy (Captain First Rank). 
123 Helsingin Sanomat 27.4.1993. 
124 Agreement concluded between France, Great Britain and Russian regarding 
the Åland Islands on 30.3.1856 (pp. 1-2, Finnish translation), Printing office 
of the Finnish Council of State, November 1926. 
125 Stjernfelt, Bertil 1991: Ålands hav och öar - brygga eller barriär? (pp.  16-17), 
Svensk-finsk försvarsfråga 1915-1945, Marinlitteraturföreningen, No. 72, 
Karlskrona. 
126 Sauramo, L.J. 1938: Fortification of the Åland Islands and the agreement of 
1921 (pp. 11-12), Publications of the Coastal Artillery Officer Association, 
Printing Office of the Association of Rural Councils. 
B. Stjernfelt was not referring only to Swedish activity. As far as the 
contribution of the inhabitants of the Åland Islands is concerned, the 
reader is referred to the article "Freedom for Finland - the Åland Islands 
for Sweden", published by the activist Julius Sundblom in December 1917 
(pp. 18-19). 
127 Sauramo, L.J. (p. 13) and Stjernfelt, B. (pp. 28-29). 
128 Sauramo, L.J. (pp. 14-15). 
129 Stjernfelt, B. (pp. 40). 
130 Agreement No. 1 regarding the non-fortification and neutrality of the 
Åland Islands, Statutes of Finland, 1922, No. 64, Printing Office of the 
Finnish Council of State, Helsinki. The Åland Agreement is usually referred 
to as the agreement of 1921 after its year of signing, but sometimes as the 
agreement of 1922, after its ratification. The expression 'agreement of 1921' 
would seem more justifiable. 
131 Castrén, Erik, Non-fortification and neutrality of the Åland Islands, Lakimies 
no. 3/1939, p. 269. 
132 Erich, Rafael, Finnish Constitutional Law, Part I, Helsinki, 1924, p. 183. 
133 See Björkholm, Mikaela & Rosas, Allan, Ålandsöarnas demilitarisering och 
neutralisering, Åbo 1990, p. 70. 
134 Agreement No. 1 regarding the non-fortification and neutrality of the 
Åland Islands. 
135 Memorandum no. 334/7 g/Sot/D3/24.1.1983, of the Department of Military 
Affairs of the Finnish Ministry of Defence, pp. 8-9. 
136 Stjernfelt, B. (p. 112-113). 
137 Manninen, Ohto, Compilation based on material published in the Military 
Magazine in 1993. 
138 Bill placed before Parliament by the Finnish government for an agreement 
to be concluded with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding 
94 
demilitarization and non-fortification of the Åland Islands. Parliamentary 
session of 1940, No. 105, Helsinki, 3rd November 1940. Printing office of 
the Finnish Council of State, Helsinki. 
139 Hägglund, Gustav, interview in Nya Åland 22.32.1994. "Ni ska vara 
tacksamma..." 
140 The reader is referred to the recently published paper by Anders Gardberg, 
Åland Islands, A Strategic Survey (Finnish Defence Studies, 8,1995). In 
view of the existence of this work devoted entirely to the Åland Islands, we 
will not enter here into any more extensive discussion of the islands as an 
operational area nor of their significance to military strategy. 
95 
m 
TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE COUNTRIES AROUND THE BALTIC 
FINLAND 	 Vyborg 
	
- 	 Turku 	 - 
Helsinki 
-;" 	St. Petersburg 
• 
P' 	0 "` 	 Not precisely 
h 	^ 	----- • Tallinn 	 defined 
a~ fl a 
Muskö 	' 	% 	Haapsalu 	 RUSSIA 
-.5,', ' 	ESTONIA 
SWEDEN  
• Gothenburg  
 Liepaja 	 LATVIA 
Karlskrona DENMARK ;  
- 
Coa 	Klaipeda 
Ko sgr 	; 	 _' LITHUANIA 
 I SWEDEN 12nm 
a p' 	 ' 	 DENMARK 3nm 
bu 	o;-' 	' 	
`
el 	Kaliningra 	 GERMANY 12 nm • ,- •stka POLAND 	12 nm 
" 	Gdynia LITHUANIA 12 nm 
Warnemiind 
Ec rnfor • 	 A 	•Kolobrzek 	Gdansk W LATVIA 	12 nm 
• Q winemi nde ESTONIA 12 nm 
Kiel 	GERMANY 	 POLAND 	 RUSSIA 	12 nm 
FINLAND 12 nm 
J 
QCD 
Bjorn  
BOUNDARIES OF THE ÅLAND ISLANDS 
DEMILITARIZED ZONE 
i UTÖ 
® ZONE DEFINED BY AGREEMENTS 
OF 1921 AND 1940 
KA 	3 N.M. BORDER DEFINED 
-- - 	IN AGREEMENTS 
Suomen 	-- 4 N.M. LIMIT 
Leijona 	--- 12 N.M. LIMIT 
BASES OF THE RUSSIAN BALTIC FLEET 
Tallinn 
Primorsk 
Bater erna' 	° 
I 	l Kronstadt / 
Lomonosov 
Riga 
ESTONIA 
LATVIA 
RUSSIA 
Liepaja 
Klaipeda 
LITHUANIA 
altiys 
Kaliningrad 
APPENDIX 4 
RUSSIAN (SOVIET) SHIPS MAKING UP THE BALTIC FLEET 
Source: The Military Balance in Northern Euroae 1990-1991.1993-1994 and 1994-1995 
1990 1993 1995 
Cruisers/battleships 1 2 2 
Sverdlov-cl. (1) 
Kirov-cl. (1) (1) 
Kresta I (1) (1) 
Destroyers 4 5 3 
Kynda (1) (1) 
Kashin mod (1) (1) 
Kildin mod (1) 
Kashin (1) (1) 
Udaloy II (2) 
Sovremennyy (3) 
Frigates 33 32 21 
Krivak II (1) (1) (1) 
Krivak I (5) (5) (5) 
Grisha I-V (4) (4) (2) 
Grisha II (2) 
Mirka (7) (3) (3) 
Petya (1) (4) (4) 
Riga (1) 
Parchim H (12) (12) (12) 
Neustrashimyi (1) (1) 
Koni (2) 
Missile boats / corvettes 46 42 42 
Tarantul I-III (12) (13) (14) 
Nanuchka I-II (9) (11) (11) 
Matka (10) (8) (7) 
Osa I-II (15) (9) 
Minesweepers 60 32 23 
Natya I-II (4) (4) (3) 
Yurka (10) (4) 
T-43 (4) 
ndryusha (2) (2) (2) 
Sonya (18) (22) (17) 
Gorya (1) 
Zhenya (2) 
Sasha (2) 
Vanya (18) 
Landing craft 21 20 9 
Ivan Rogov-cl. construction (1) 
lligator-cl. (2) (2) (2) 
Ropucha-cl. (7) (6) (6) 
Polnocny -cl. (12) (3) (1) 
Submarines 28 20 16 
Juliett (2) (5) (4) 
Tango (3) 
Foxtrot (5) (13) (9) 
Whiskey (16) 
Kilo (2) (1) (2) 
Lima (1) (1) 
The German Navy 
Numbers 
250 
200 
150 
100 
50 
n 
Year 80 85 90 94 
Submarines 	❑  24 24 36 20 
Destroyers 11 7 6 6 
Frigates 	® 12 9 16 8 
Combat crafts ® 56 54 45 38 
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Submarines 	❑  6 8 7 5 
Destroyers 
Frigates 	® 8 10 14 8 
Combat crafts ® 20 16 32 20 
Minesweepers 14 13 9 10 
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COMPLEMENT OF THE RUSSIAN BALTIC FLEET IN THE 1990 s 
AND MAIN WEAPONS SYSTEMS ON BOARD 
VESSELS TYPE 1991-1992 1992-1993 1994-1995 Armaments *j 
SUBMARINES 
* Juliett SSG 5 5 4 SS-N-3A 
*Kilo SS 1 1 2 
* Foxtrot SS 13 13 9 
*Lima SA 1 1 1 
Total 20 20 16 
CRUISERS 
* Kirov CGN 1 1 1 SS-N-19 SSM / SS-N-14 ASW 
* Kresta I CG 1 1 1 SS-N-3B SSM 
Total 2 2 2 
DESTROYERS 
* Udaloy II DDG 1 - 1 SS-N-14 /ASW RL 
* Sovremennyj DDG 2 3 2 SS-N-22 SSM 
* Kynda CG 1 1 - SS-N-3B SSM 
* Kashin DDG 1 1 - 
Total 5 5 3 
FRIGATES 
* Krivak II FFG 1 1 1 SS-N-14 ASW 
* Krivak I 5 5 5 
* Neustrashimy - 1 1 
* Koni FFG - 2 - AEW QL 
* Grisha FFL 2 4 2 
* Mirka FFL - 3 - 
* Petya - 4 - 
* Parchim (AS W) 12 12 12 
Total 20 20 21 
CORVETTES AND MISSILE SHIPS 
* Tarantel ASUW 12 13 14 
* Nanuchka ASUW 12 11 11 
* Matka PHM 10 8 7 
* Osa I-II PBM 10 9 - 
Total 44 41 32 
MINELAYERS AND MINESWEEPERS 
Total 32 32 23 
LANDING CRAFT 
Total 32 11 9 
2 (2) 
KEY: 
ASUW Anti-submarine 
CG Missile cruiser 
CGN Cruiser carrying nuclear missiles 
DDG Missile destroyer 
FEG Missile frigate 
FEL Light frigate 
PBM Patrol boat armed with missiles 
PHM Missile ship 
SA Supply submarine 
SS Conventional submarine 
SSG Submarine carrying nuclear missiles 
SOURCES: 
The Military Balance in Northern Europe 1991-1992, 1992-1993, 1994-1995 
The Naval Institute, Guide to the Soviet Navy, 5. edition, 1991 
Jane's Fighting Ships 1992-1993 
*) For key, see Appendix 14 
APPENDIX 14 
DUAL-PURPOSE WEAPONS USED BY THE RUSSIAN BALTIC FLEET 
VESSELS Number Weapon 
type 
Armament Total Warheads 
1992-1993 1991-1992 1992-1993 1994-1995 
Juliett SSG 5 5 4 SLCM 4 * SS-N-3A 20 
Kirov CGN - 1 1 SLCM 20 * SS-N-19 20 
Kresta I CG - 1 1 SLCM 2* 2 SS-N-3B 4 
Sovremenny DDG - 3 2 SLCM 2 * 4 SS-N-22 24 
Krivak FFG 6 6 1 SLCM /ASW "r * 4 SS-N-9 24 
Nanuchka ASUW 12 6 11 SLCM 2 * 3 SS-N-9 36 
Total 128 
KEY: 
Number of nuclear warheads as of 1993. 
ASW 	Antisubmarine warfare 
QL 	Quadrupole launcher 
RL 	Rocket launcher 
SS 	Surface to surface 
SLCM 	Sea launched cruise missile 
SSM 	Surface to surface missile 
SOURCES: 
The Military Balance in Northern Europe 1994-1995 
The Naval Institute, Guide to the Soviet Navy, 5. edition, 1991 
The Naval Institute, World Naval Weapons Systems 1991-1992 
Jane's Armour and Artillery 1992-1993 
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